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THE SPIRIT OF MAN



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THE SPIRIT OF MAN



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## INTRODUCTION

THIS ESSAY is an attempt to suggest a few of the philosophical implications, theoretical and practical, which Christianity contains. I have ventured to make a humble contribution to a work which much wants doing. Of late years the historical claims of Christianity have been ably vindicated ; the strength of its documentary evidence has been successfully displayed. But, still, everyone must necessarily approach the consideration of evidence with certain antecedent notions and prejudices. Certain facts he is ready to accept if sufficient testimony can be adduced ; against others he inexorably sets his face, and is resolved to regard their so-called evidence as mere delusion which must be explained away. These preconceptions

may be roughly termed philosophical. They rest on the views which a man entertains as to the nature of knowledge and the nature of morality. He is bound to reject a religion which seems to involve false corollaries on these subjects ; and, on the other hand, if its metaphysical and ethical implications seem sound and valuable, he will be ready to give a fair hearing to its historical attestation. The subject is thus a vast one, alike in its area and in its importance. In touching upon it I have kept strictly to a single line, and have merely emphasized the doctrine of *individual personality*, which Christianity seems to me to contain, and which is, as I think, the only true foundation for a theory of knowledge and conduct. Thus in the first chapter I have tried to show that the Christian doctrine of creation guarantees individuality in the acquisition of knowledge without destroying the unity of truth, and allows us to recognise a difference between reason and sensation without thereby falling into dualism. Of course it is true that Christianity, as such, is committed to no special analysis of knowledge ;

and I have merely contended that the doctrine alluded to adds completeness and intelligibility to an analysis which commends itself on general grounds. In the second and third chapters I have argued that this personality is essentially spiritual, that it was the work of Christ to re-create it in its true nature, and that it is exhibited in an eternal life to be lived on earth as well as in Heaven ; in the fourth, that such a spiritual personality sets the freedom of man on the only firm and intelligible basis ; in the fifth and sixth, that its perfect development throughout the human brotherhood is the goal alike of morality and of the institutions of society. Further, I have illustrated what I conceive to be the Christian theory on these subjects by contrasting it with the views of various philosophers. These views I have had to state shortly ; if I have misstated them, it is not due to malice or, in many cases, to lack of admiration. In particular, I am anxious to express my general obligations to the philosophy of Hegel, and can only regret that, in spite of his extraordinary insight into the facts of life, he should have



consented to sacrifice individuality to the exigencies of Dialectic.

There are dangers as well as advantages in the strong protest against individualism which is making itself heard on every side. The individualist is the Sophist of modern times, and is being tracked out and hunted down with a zeal and success not unworthy of Plato. His philosophy has been laid bare as a great complex fallacy, comprising sensationalism in Metaphysics, nominalism in Logic, sensualism in Ethics, natural rights in Political Philosophy, and Calvinism in Theology. The exposure has come none too soon, and is matter for rejoicing. But the reaction is tending to carry some thinkers to the opposite and equally false extreme. It seems to be supposed that the individual is necessarily an individualist, and accordingly individuality itself has become an object of suspicion and dislike. Under the hands of writers belonging to most various schools the individual is made to disappear altogether. In metaphysics and morality he is resolved into an 'accident' in the life of a world-

spirit ; in politics and religion he becomes a 'limb' in a social or ecclesiastical organism. This denial of personal freedom and responsibility in knowledge and conduct cannot be the true solution of the problem. Freedom and responsibility must be maintained if anything worth doing is to be done in either sphere ; and Christianity believes that they can be turned to good account. It is, in fact, only by the recognition of the true nature and objects of individuality that individualism can be finally disproved as a theory of knowledge and condemned as a principle of action. If I have been able to illustrate in any way the truth and clearness of the Christian theory on the subject, my object will have been attained.

I can well understand that many Christians, whether theologians or not, may resent the intrusion of philosophy into matters of religion. But I would venture to suggest that a Christian philosophy is not the same thing as a philosophy of Christianity. The latter is apt to ignore the essence of religion, which consists in a personal relation between God and the human spirit ; it

merely collects the maxims and principles found in Christian writers, combines them into a speculative system, treats their devotional language as local colour or Eastern mysticism, deprecates their lack of scientific analysis and philosophical phraseology, and finally consents to admit that they contain, in a distorted form, some very obvious truths of permanent importance. Christian philosophy, on the contrary, starts with religion as a living reality, and, in unfolding some of the principles involved in it, treats them as mere applications or illustrations of that spiritual relationship which exists behind them and which gives them their whole value and significance. If it becomes apparent that these principles, thus derived, yield a more coherent and satisfactory view of life than is offered in other philosophies, this fact may fairly be urged in favour of the Christian Faith, and may, at any rate, suggest a candid examination of the documents on which the truth of that Faith is founded.

# THE SPIRIT OF MAN



## I

### KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

WHAT is the relation between the real world around us on the one hand, and our knowledge of it on the other? What relation does the knowledge of the naturalist bear to the objects which he collects, or the knowledge of the mathematician or the moralist to the facts which they investigate? Common sense is ready at once with an answer : ' Knowledge is a copy of the real world outside us.' Real objects endowed with figure, motion, and colour exist independently of us, and knowledge is the process by which they are reflected in our minds. This is the theory, or rather the assump-

tion, with which, probably, all men start; and any attempt to question or examine it is resented by many as an exhibition of hair-splitting metaphysics, certainly useless, and probably also mischievous. Nevertheless we may venture to inquire in what sense it is asserted that knowledge is a copy of a real outside world. Those items of knowledge which are naturally quoted as being a kind of message sent to us direct from things outside are the feelings of which we are conscious through the senses. But then it is obvious at once that the feelings of sound and taste and smell cannot be regarded as a copy, good or bad, of any archetype outside. The utmost they tell us is that the thing to which we refer them must have the power to produce these feelings in us. And the same is the case with the sensation of colour conveyed in the sense of sight. It is true, of course, that the sensations of colour have physical conditions in the neural disturbances investigated by science, but they cannot possibly be regarded as copies of those conditions. The feeling itself is utterly dif-

ferent from the antecedent conditions necessary to our experiencing it. It is the sense of touch which has always been regarded as the strongest and clearest evidence concerning 'things outside.' But this feeling is in itself merely a feeling of resistance and in no sense a copy of the real constitution of those things. Like the other sensations, it merely suggests a power which 'things' possess to produce this feeling in our minds. Thus, as far as sensation goes, the theory that our knowledge is a copy, and that the 'real world outside' is the pattern from which that copy is taken, will not work. Even in sensation *our* world goes far beyond the *real* world, the real world being simply a collection of unknown 'powers' for the production of items of knowledge which are quite unlike and heterogeneous to those powers themselves.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'If Sugar produce in us the Ideas which we call Whiteness and Sweetness, we are sure there is a Power in Sugar to produce those Ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it.'—*Locke, Essay* ii. 31, § 32.

'There is nothing like our Ideas existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them, only a Power to produce those Sensations in us : and what is Sweet, Blue, or Warm



And this divergence of knowledge from 'reality' is equally striking when we pass from sensation to objects of experience, objects investigated by the sciences. It is so even in that grade of science which consists in observing and classifying things that can be seen and touched. Here, indeed, we might be disposed to fight for our assumption, and

in Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the insensible Parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call so' (*ib.* 8, § 15). In this passage, mere 'secondary ideas' of colour and taste, and so forth, are distinguished from Ideas of Primary Qualities, Bulk and Figure, &c., as to which we are told that *they*, at any rate, are 'resemblances of bodies,' and that 'their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves.' But we are dismayed to find that the *Pattern and Resemblance* theory has to be abandoned even in the case of the latter. 'Our senses failing us in the Discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute Parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities as the Characteristical Notes and Marks whereby to frame Ideas of them in our minds, and distinguish them one from another—all which secondary Qualities, as has been shown, are nothing but bare Powers' (*ib.* 23, § 8). In fact, starting with the common-sense notion that the qualities of bodies are copied in our ideas, Locke is compelled to resolve this external pattern into three unknown factors: first, the unknown substratum in which the qualities exist; secondly, the unknown bulk, texture, &c., which are the primary qualities of the body; thirdly, the unknown powers which produce secondary ideas in our minds.

maintain that the flowers of the botanist's knowledge are copies of real flowers outside. But in maintaining this we should probably be thinking principally of that part of his knowledge which consists in the mere apprehension of colour and scent, and we have shown already that colour and scent have no archetypes from which they can be copied. And, further, the apprehension of colour and scent in particular flowers is a very small part of the botanist's knowledge. His knowledge consists mainly in his grasp of the relations which connect or sever one sort of flower from another. And this knowledge of affinities and distinctions is not sensuously given with the object in perception, but is intellectually inferred through laborious processes of comparison. If we are still bent on defending our position, we must hold not only that the objects of knowledge exist independently of knowledge, but also that in this independent existence they are equipped with a sort of ready-made outfit of relations, in which they are flashed upon the mind of the man of science.



And still more decisively does the photographic theory fail us when we leave observation for experiment, and investigate the inter-action of one object with another. When, after carefully conducted experiments, we know the law that two compounds explode if mixed together, in what sense can the principles of causation and uniformity, involved in such knowledge, be regarded as copies of anything outside?

The fallacy which lies at the root of this whole theory of knowledge is not hard to understand, however difficult it may be to eradicate it. We are all aware of some sense-stimulus coming to us from without, in reaction upon which we fashion our universe of knowledge. We don't know what that stimulus was in itself; we only know that, in obedience to its promptings, we have constructed our wonderful world of colour and figure, sound and motion. But then, in reflecting upon this world of our construction, we remember the original pressure of that message from without. We wish to acknowledge our obligations for that which we

then received. And, in doing so, we make the hasty assumption that the stimulus from outside was something of the same sort as the universe which we have made, something like it, only more so, related to it as the complete is related to the fragmentary, and as the pattern is related to the copy. Thus what we oppose to our own constructive activity is precisely that which this activity has itself constructed; what we are setting up in antithesis to reason is not the mere sense-stimulus, but the completion of that very world of experience which reason itself has fashioned in reaction upon sense-stimulus. We have transformed bare sensation into rational fact; we have invested it with the fulness and richness of meaning which belong only to the intelligible world. And in doing so we have not only committed a logical blunder, but have also made scepticism an inevitable corollary. For we are aware that, in constructing our rational universe of truth, we have 'interpreted' and transformed the original datum of sensation. Hence, if sensation is rational fact

knowledge is a continuous and progressive departure from fact. If sensation is the archetype, our rational copy of it is scandalously bad. Our whole system of experience is a garbled and untrustworthy version of the *real* universe outside; our knowledge is 'phenomenal' in comparison with an 'absolute' which fronts us as the unknown and the unknowable. But we have no occasion whatever thus to set up an absolute system of reality in antithesis to our own system of knowledge. This is a false antithesis, in which two true and valuable antitheses are distorted and obscured. The first is the antithesis of distinct factors, which together produce our system of knowledge. Since reason constructs the universe of experience by its work upon sensation, we may contrast reason and sensation as logically distinguishable factors in the formation of experience. But to set up that very world of experience itself, and to contrast *that* with reason, and to argue that, confronted with *that*, reason and all rational products are vain things fondly imagined, is to accuse reason of barrenness

and incapacity just because of the boundless splendour and the inexhaustible suggestiveness of her work. We are simply shying at our own shadow when we set up an unknowable world of real fact, in contrast with which our known world of *soi-disant* fact is to be put to shame. Reality stands in no outside relation to knowledge. Real fact is rational fact, the product and not the antithesis of reason.

And, secondly, we may legitimately contrast our present achievement in the way of knowledge with an ideal of fuller knowledge to be achieved hereafter. The known may be contrasted with the unknown—the 'unknown' being equivalent to the not-yet-known. This is a contrast between the lower and the higher stages of our knowledge, a distinction of degree and not a difference in kind, a contrast within the sphere of knowledge and not a contrast between knowledge itself and something which defies it from without. It is a sheer fallacy to mistake a distinction of degree for one of kind, and to distort the unknown into

the unknowable ; a fallacy rooted in a childish impatience of difficulties, and issuing in the passionate assertion, that what we don't understand can't be understood.

Thus Mr. Spencer is induced, by some difficulties with regard to Time and Space, and by a radical misunderstanding of the philosophical meaning of infinity, to declare 'that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must ever be, unknown.'<sup>1</sup> Again : ' Ultimate Scientific Ideas are all representative of realities that cannot be comprehended. After no matter how great a progress in the colligation of facts and the establishment of generalisations ever wider and wider—after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths that are larger and deeper has been carried no matter how far—the fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever.'<sup>2</sup> And so again : ' Manifestly, as the *most* general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a *more* general one, it cannot be understood.'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *First Principles*, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* p. 66.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* p. 73.

Now when the nature of Ultimate truth, or Infinity, or the Absolute, is properly understood, it does not guarantee such conclusions as these. Infinity is to be sought *in* the system of knowledge, not outside it. It is not the negation of experience, but the completion of experience as an articulated whole. Absolute truth is being gradually attained in the more and more thorough grasp and comprehension of the various items of truth in their systematic relation to each other. It is difficult enough to attain to such a comprehension; but this is no reason for calling it impossible. And to do so has very serious results. For, whilst the existence of an 'unknown' stimulates inquiry, the assertion of an 'unknowable' paralyses it.<sup>1</sup> The Absolute is indeed unknown, in the sense that we have not yet attained to that completeness of a coherent and comprehensive system of experience in which

<sup>1</sup> I notice an identical statement ('the unknown stimulates, the unknowable paralyses, knowledge') in a sermon published in Mr. Aubrey Moore's *Essays Scientific and Philosophical*, p. 265.



Absolute truth consists. 'The Infinite' is still beyond us, as an ideal of knowledge, self-explanatory, self-bounded, and self-contained. But these are ideals of a perfect knowledge, and not the bugbear of a blank and featureless unknowable. They are ideals, moreover, which are being gradually realised as fresh insight into the connectedness of things is painfully acquired, and as the unity of a systematic whole makes itself slowly felt in the midst of the disjointed and the irrelevant.

Our result so far is that the 'copyist' view of knowledge breaks down, because on analysis we find that there is nothing to be copied. The apparent archetype, which knowledge was to imitate, turned out on examination to be the system of knowledge itself, gratuitously 'ejected' from the mind, and humorously termed 'unknowable.'

The next step must of necessity be to identify knowledge and reality. But in what sense? Is one of them to be sacrificed to the other? And, if so, which?

(ii.) The first possible theory subordinate

knowledge to reality—makes knowledge one particular manifestation of force or energy.

On this theory very little need be said. It cannot stand the smallest criticism, and has by implication been dealt with above.

It tells us that knowledge is one of the many forms which a Protean Force is capable of assuming. But then the very fact that Force is manifold in its appearances goes against the theory. For it is the distinguishing mark of knowledge that it is a unity comprising differences within itself. Knowledge is a synthesis of differences ; it is through knowledge that we hold together the various manifestations of Force, and have been able so to compare them as to arrive at the conception of Force itself. Knowledge, as the identity in which differences exist, cannot itself be one of those differences. If Force be either motion, or sound, or *thought*, where is the unity in which they are identified? Where is the central one-ness of Force itself? To *thought* there can be Force, because thought can compare and



discern an identity underlying the differences in light and sound and motion; and this identity, intellectually apprehended, is what we mean by Force. But, if thought be co-ordinated with motion and light and sound, the bond of union is at once dissolved and we are left with a bare juxtaposition of disconnected facts. Force is a mental concept, an item of knowledge, due to elaborate intellectual processes of abstraction and comparison. There is no more sense in calling knowledge a manifestation of Force than in calling the solar system a manifestation of some particular star which it contains. And the same must be said of those 'corpuscles,' whose cause is so vigorously championed by Professor Case in his *Physical Realism*. Mr. Case argues that sensations and ideas can never form a basis for physical science, because the structures and motions of imperceptible particles, which physical science proves to exist, cannot be inferred from merely psychical data. There is no passage from the psychical to the physical. Thus, if the teach-

ing of science is to be accepted, the data of sense, from which it starts, must be physical and not psychical; they must consist in 'the nervous system itself sensibly affected. The hot felt is the tactile nerves heated, the white seen is the optic nerves so coloured' (p. 24).

But, in the first place, it is difficult to distinguish 'the hot felt,' which is a physical object, from the feeling of heat, which is a psychical sensation, and by which the object is 'apprehended.' And if they are distinct, how can there be a transition from one to the other? If, as Mr. Case asserts, there is no passage from the psychical to the physical, how can there be one from the physical to the psychical? In other words, how can 'a psychical operation apprehend a physical object?' and how can there be a further transition from a *physical* object *psychically* apprehended to those *intellectual* inferences which establish the reality of the imperceptible world of science?

Secondly, apart from this *argumentum ad hominem*, it must be asserted that we have no

right to oppose physical objects to mental ideas in this absolute fashion. So far as material things are known to exist, they are *ipso facto* ideas, or objects of knowledge constituted such by the interpretation of sense by understanding. And this account, which holds of perceived objects, will hold *a fortiori* of imperceptible structures. Having swallowed the body, we are not likely to strain at the corpuscle. Having explained bodies as objects of knowledge, in the formation of which reason has had a share, we shall explain corpuscles as somewhat more complicated objects of knowledge, in which the work of reason has been somewhat greater. The philosophy of the corpuscle will have its place as one subdivision in our philosophy of nature. Mr. Case's *protégés* are ideas without ceasing to be things ; they are ideas, as being objects of knowledge inferred by science ; and they are also things in so far as this inference is a valid one.

(iii.) In sharp antithesis to this we have the other extreme theory, which says that *Knowledge is*

*itself Reality.* Fact is here resolved into idea ; the universe of fact is held to consist in men's ideas, taking idea in the wide sense as content of the mind. Reality exists fully and exhaustively in our ideas, and to seek it elsewhere is a sheer delusion. Now, this idealism falls into two subdivisions according to the view taken as to the nature and constitution of these ideas. (*a*) By one section (that of the subjective idealists) they are regarded as particular feelings, uncompounded and unanalysable, hard, separate, and self-dependent, received by reason ready made, and then sorted and arranged by reason according to the particular sequences and combinations in which they have made their appearance on particular occasions. Reason is not their parent, but rather their guardian, safe-guarding their independence and controlling their vagaries, and finally (in Hume) dispensed with altogether as an effete and unnecessary adjunct. Particularity is the key-note of this form of idealism ; and its main defect is its failure to give us (*a*) any adequate criterion of truth, or

(b) any adequate basis for the generalisations of science ; both these shortcomings being due to the fallacy of regarding ideas as ready-made particulars, and not as rationally constructed universals. With regard to the first point, neither Berkeley nor Hume have any satisfactory standard for distinguishing fact from fancy. With both of them the test of truth is found simply in the strength or persistence of ideas, their vivacity, steadiness, coherence, &c., qualities which, as Hume admits, are often possessed by the falsest of delusions.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to science, subjective idealism declares general knowledge to be impossible. Berkeley, as a true particularist, denies that he can form any 'abstract' general ideas. 'Whether others have the wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas they best can tell. For myself, I find, indeed, I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the idea of those *particular* things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.

<sup>1</sup> Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 33 ; Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I. Part I. §§ 1, 3.



I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape or colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described.<sup>1</sup>

Berkeley does indeed allow that observations and experiments may still be made with regard to nature, and general conclusions drawn from them; but the validity of such conclusions rests not on 'any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves,' but on 'God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world.'<sup>2</sup> And he adds this significant conclusion: 'By a diligent observation of the phenomena within

<sup>1</sup> *Introduction to Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 107.

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<sup>2</sup> *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 107.



our view we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena ; I do not say *demonstrate*, for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles, which we cannot evidently know.’<sup>1</sup>

This belief in general laws is thus a belief in the probable uniformity of action by the Deity as a corollary to His goodness to mankind. It rests entirely on the theory that true ideas are a direct communication from the Deity, and it merely means that these true particulars will probably continue to come to us in the same combinations and groupings in which they have been received before. It implies not the substitution of universals for particulars, but only the apotheosis of the particular. And no solid foundation for science can be supplied by the particular, from whatever source it may be derived. With Hume the ‘sup-

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 107.

position that the future will resemble the past' rests entirely on the customary conjunction of the objects in past experience, is, as he himself declares, completely devoid of rational justification, and, further, entirely fails to explain the establishment of a causal nexus on a single crucial instance.

And these defects in Berkeley and Hume are not due to any looseness of philosophic terminology, but to a radical error in their systems. They were caused, as already suggested, by their failure to see that the ideas which they talk about are essentially rational, saturated with inference, not particulars but universals, not disconnected atoms but related elements in a single whole. The 'tawny man' whom Berkeley accepts is as much a rational universal as the 'man' whom he rejects. And Hume's original experience of a particular conjunction implies a synthesising work of reason which is competent to form universal conjunctions too.

The moral here is that a true attitude to science depends always on a true theory of perception, and

that sensationalism as a theory of perception must logically lead to scepticism with regard to science.

(*b*) These defects are partly met by a second kind of idealism, which resolves reality not into a sequence of particular feelings, but into a system of related thoughts. These thoughts are universals, absolutely rational in character, and inter-connected with each other as members of a system which is reason itself. In England the late Professor T. H. Green has been the ablest champion of this Objective Idealism, and we may take him as its representative. According to Green, then, reality consists in rational ideas systematically connected in a single whole, within which the various members affect and are affected by each other; the relations in which they stand to each other constituting both the distinctive nature of each several item and also the significance of the system as a whole.

What, then, is the character of these ideas which are thus related to each other, and how are they distinguished from the ideas of the subjective

idealists, from Berkeley's 'ideas of sense' and Hume's 'impressions?' The answer is that to Berkeley and Hume ideas were given facts, constituted independently of reason, and with regard to which reason could act only as a sort of receiving clerk or organising secretary, interpreting, sorting, and arranging, but in no sense producing, them. But to Green there is none of this outside relation between reason and idea. Reason is implied in idea; apart from reason ideas would have no meaning and no existence. 'A sensation can only form an object of experience in being determined by an intelligent subject which distinguishes it from itself and contemplates it in relation to other sensations' (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 44). And the ideas thus constituted by reason become part of reason, 'bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh;' reason is the unity of system, and they are its constituent elements.

Here three questions at once suggest themselves:—

1. Whence do these ideas get the substantiality and solidity which belong to fact?

2. What bond of union, or guarantee of permanence, is possessed by these rational systems existing in a number of separate individuals?

3. How is the growth of experience accounted for?

The answer to all these questions is that knowledge in each individual thinker comes as a direct communication from a divine self-consciousness; that an eternal intelligence 'partially and gradually reproduces itself in us, communicating piecemeal, but in inseparable correlation, understanding and the facts understood, experience and the experienced world.'<sup>1</sup>

This theory of communicative self-reproduction answers the question as to the *substantiality* of rational ideas by referring these ideas, conceived as substantial, to an eternal intelligence, from which they and their substantiality (understanding and *the facts understood*, &c.) are afterwards imparted to us. There is certainly a beautiful simplicity in this explanation. For, of course, we can get out of

<sup>1</sup> *Proleg.* § 36.



an eternal intelligence just what we first put into it. But such a method of solving a difficulty in human knowledge by assuming its solution in a non-human intelligence can scarcely be considered satisfactory. It would seem to be a simpler and more adequate explanation to regard sensation as the thickening ingredient which, when mingled with rational processes, produces the solidity of fact. Green, however, for reasons given below, deprecates this distinction between 'the form and matter of experience' (§ 43), and prefers to import rational fact in concrete indissolubility from an eternal consciousness; he merely substitutes a system of unanalysed universals for the sequence of unanalysed particulars which the subjective idealists present to us. And his theory has further an obvious resemblance to Berkeley's, in regarding truth as directly transmitted from the divine to the human consciousness.

Secondly, the permanence of truth is explained by the same reference to 'a consciousness for which the relations of fact that form the object of

our gradually attained knowledge already and eternally exist;<sup>1</sup> and the unity of truth is similarly accounted for on the theory that this one eternal consciousness is reproducing itself in many minds. But in this latter point he certainly seems to prove too much. He explains the unity of knowledge in a way which turns diversity and error into insoluble enigmas. It is true that, in the reproduction of itself, the eternal consciousness uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ (§ 71), and it is apparently this fact which is held accountable for the differences and the blunders which occur in the conceptions of the world as held by various individuals. But then our knowledge of the sentient life is part of the knowledge communicated to us. We have been, in fact, expressly told that such sentient life has no independent reality; that it is a fact only so far as determined by relations, and that these relations do not exist for it, but for the thinking consciousness on which it and they alike depend for being what they are

<sup>1</sup> *Proleg.* § 69.

(§ 48). And now, on the contrary, the sentient life appears as 'a thing in itself' in the crudest sense, receiving, but at the same time scattering and adulterating, the divine message which filters through it. The dualism of which Professor Green has such a horror seems to reappear here in an aggravated form.

Nor, lastly, does this theory of the self-reproduction of an eternal consciousness in human minds really explain the development of human knowledge. The natural account of the matter would seem to be this. Knowledge is produced by the inter-action of two elements which, though inseparable in fact, are clearly distinguishable on analysis, namely, sensation and a synthesising reason. And the progress of knowledge is the increasingly thorough and comprehensive explanation of items of experience thus produced. Sensation stimulates reason to form an object of experience ; and reason then attempts to grasp and understand this object in the light of its conditions and relations.



Now Professor Green refuses, as we stated above, to accept this distinction of elements as a real one. His main ground for this refusal (as stated in *Prolegomena*, §§ 42, 51) is that pure sensation—i.e., sensation unqualified by thought—is not a possible object of experience. This is, of course, perfectly true, and perhaps required emphatic statement. But when we have admitted, or rather insisted, that the work of reason upon sensation is necessary to the most rudimentary experience, we are scarcely justified in concluding that therefore sensation has no distinctive nature at all. And yet this is Green's inference in the sections of his work referred to. It is, of course, his dread of dualism which makes him take this course, though, as we have seen, dualism avenges itself upon him at the last. He is afraid of setting up two separate sources of experience, and thereby establishing two separate worlds of fact. But the fear is really groundless. A duality of elements in experience is not a dualism of sources of experience. We may assert a duality of elements whilst at the same time we

maintain the singleness of experience itself, and the inadmissibility of pretending to any knowledge of the nature of each element taken separately, or of the quota which each contributes to the formation of the experience which results from their joint action. Such a theory may require exactness of statement to avoid misconceptions ; but it is better to risk some misconception than to do such violence to the facts as is involved in Green's treatment of sensation.

(iv.) Both the attempts at identifying Knowledge and Reality, as just described, have identified them by sacrificing one to the other. But a more real and thorough identification is possible. We may refuse to hold a brief for Reality against Knowledge, or for Knowledge against Reality. We may believe in an identical world of Truth, of which Knowledge and Reality are different aspects, and in which sensation and reason are the constituent elements. Truth is thus a 'concrete identity' resting on a fusion of differences, a fact complex and yet single, produced by the inter-

action of those elements. In talking of this concrete identity of Truth, we may wish to lay special emphasis on one or other of the elements or differences involved in it. We may be regarding it from the point of view of reason, looking at it as a difficult mental achievement of our own, as the outcome of laborious processes of inference, and in that case we shall call it knowledge. Or we may be considering it rather as objective fact, as the interpretation of an imperious message from without which may come to others too, as not restricted to our own mental history, but as a possession held by us in common with our fellow-creatures—and in that case we shall call it reality. But in distinguishing these aspects of truth we do not mean to oppose them to each other. Knowledge is only a subjective name for reality, and reality an objective name for knowledge. 'Reality' emphasises the presence of sensation: 'Knowledge' gives prominence to the work of reason. But sensation must be interpreted by reason to produce reality; and reason must be stimulated

by sensation to build up knowledge. Truth is one indivisible whole, which may be called either knowledge or reality according to the special aspect which we wish to emphasise. We cannot contrast knowledge with reality, because they are the same. We *can* contrast sensation with reason, but only as elements distinguishable on analysis, elements equally indispensable for the production of truth. It is vain to attempt any disruption of that one universe of truth, vain to try to assess the precise contribution of each of the two elements. We cannot say how much reason does, and how much is brought with it by sensation. All such speculations are fore-ordained to failure. Truth is one concrete whole. And not the least important of the lessons which Kant may teach us is the one which in his own case was never wholly learnt, namely, the impossibility of referring to reason, apart from sense, a certain amount of truth (e.g., that system of categories which is nothing less than a complete ground-plan of the future edifice of experience); and the impossibility again



of crediting sense, apart from reason, with other items of information, *empirical* information given in the so-called judgments of perception.<sup>1</sup> In opposition to all such attempts we must maintain the unity and indivisibility of truth. And yet, on the other hand, we must not ignore the fact that within this unity of truth there is a diversity of elements, elements which are none the less distinct in character because they are inseparable in operation. The synthesising reason is for ever distinct from the stimulus of sense. And so the relation of reason to the world of truth is not creation but production. 'Macht zwar Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht.'

We still require an explanation of the ultimate origin of these elements themselves. It is true that we cannot profitably inquire *what* each of

<sup>1</sup> See his *Kritik of Pure Reason*, Analytik i. § 3, and *Prolegomena*, ii. § 15. Dr. Hutchison Stirling points out (*Mind*, Nos. 36, 37) that it was the treatment of the categories in the *Kritik* which led to the treatment of perception in the *Prolegomena*. The doctrine of concrete identity was one of Hegel's greatest contributions to philosophy.

them would be in itself; but we are bound to ask *whence* they come, and to form, at any rate, a reasonable hypothesis on the subject. Now, Christianity is not itself concerned with a metaphysic of knowledge, but it insists emphatically that God is the creator of the universe, and incidentally this doctrine has the greatest importance and significance for such a metaphysic. It implies that both our own interpreting reason and the message from without which stimulates it to activity, come from God, who is thus ultimately the creator of the world we know, because He has made both those elements from whose union and inter-action the world of truth springs into being. And such a doctrine has the great philosophical merit of asserting an ultimate affinity between the constituent elements of truth. They not only coalesce and co-operate to produce experience, but also proceed from a common source. United in their goal, they are united also in their origin. Thus we have here the final solution of the problem alluded to above. It is impossible to recognise a juxta-

position of alien elements in truth ; such a theory would put dislocation and multiplicity in place of unity. And in our anxiety to escape from such a conclusion we are tempted to take refuge in a 'cheap and easy monism,' which denies that there is any diversity of elements at all, thereby contradicting a patent fact of experience. The view before us yields a far more adequate explanation. According to it, there is a distinction of elements within the unity of truth, but these elements are in no sense aliens but are made by the same divine creator. The concrete identity of truth is finally guaranteed and justified when the elements that are differences in that identity are themselves seen to be reconciled in a common origin.

The result is that the world of truth is both our world and God's world. First, it is our world. It is constructed by our reason reacting upon the stimulus of sense. The whole universe of colour and sound, of law and order, of connections and affinities, is our own production, not a stranger confronting us from without, but our own offspring,



the child of our imagination and our thought. Truth is not transmitted to us ready made from an eternal self-consciousness, but is formed by each of a number of individual spirits, who, as created and not proceeding, have a nature different from, though dependent upon, the nature of the creator. In realising this individuality in the way of knowledge they may make blunders, and one man's theory of the world may well differ from another's. Individuality has its probation in the matter of knowledge as well as in the matter of morality. Patience and co-operation are required in the one as much as in the other.

But, secondly, the world is also God's world. God has created the elements from which the universe of truth is fashioned, and so we may be sure that the self-consistent body of objective knowledge which we gradually attain by purging out errors and removing prejudices has its counterpart, under whatever form, in God Himself. Space and time may be distinctively *human* forms of thought, and may act as necessary limitations

to human knowledge ; and, further, man may have lost a directness of spiritual intuition which he once possessed. To God, truth would seem to be the contemplation of a person ; to us, it is the interpretation of a message, and an interpretation which wilfulness and conceit have rendered unnecessarily hard. But, nevertheless, the message, the 'irritant' which stimulates us to activity, comes from God, who has also created the human spirit which responds to the appeal. Therefore knowledge, however laboriously and imperfectly acquired, is still a revelation of God ; God is the pledge of its unity and permanence ; *our* truth is also *the* truth as it is in Him.

## II

## THE NATURE OF MAN AND THE WORK OF CHRIST

WE have attempted to show that Knowledge and Reality are related as different aspects of one concrete identity of Truth, which is on the one hand *our* Truth (the conquest and achievement of many individuals); and on the other hand is *the* Truth (being due to the progressive inter-action of elements created by the Deity). And the same theory which holds of the nature of the universe, will naturally hold also of the nature of man, since Truth is the realisation and expression of man's nature. As was the universe, then, so also is man a concrete identity yielding differences of aspect, because compounded of distinct elements. And just as with regard to the universe blunders

and fallacies resulted mainly from false abstraction, so in the microcosm of man speculative error and moral sin proceed mainly from *one-sidedness*, from inability to maintain that single-centred harmony of nature which is the perfection of humanity. The different aspects of man's nature are familiar enough to us ; they are *body*, and the rational soul or *mind*. What is their relation to each other, and how are they both included in the central unity of man ? Speculative philosophy is apt to contrast them as strangers and rivals ; and moral philosophy then proceeds to inquire on what terms they are to associate. Are they to be independent of each other, or is one to be supreme and the other reduced to bondage ? The latter alternative is generally selected. The deep conviction which every man possesses of the unity of his nature makes it impossible for him to uphold a thorough and consistent dualism in this matter. And so, in ignorance of the real nature of the unifying principle, he tends to identify himself with one or other of these aspects of his nature. He either

asserts that *he* is mind, and that body is an irrational and rebellious animal, to be first subjugated and then ignored, or he maintains that *he* is body, a physical organism regulated by pleasure and pain, and that 'reason is and ought to be only the slave of the passions.' And yet the attempt to establish the supremacy of either necessarily fails. Suppose the body to be set up as sovereign, and reason to be its minister, still the existence of reason even in that subordinate position prevents the man from becoming merely body. With the best will in the world he *cannot* make himself a brute so long as reason survives at all. And if reason were to perish altogether, the victory of body would really be defeat, since bodily satisfactions gain their allurements through self-consciousness. And, on the other hand, a similar triumph achieved by the mind would imply its complete sterilisation and utter inactivity, since desire or passion of some sort is necessary to action, and in all passion and desire the body is a necessary condition. All rational motives have their psychical



counterpart in desire, and, as motives are the mainspring of action, the attempt to eliminate desire means the paralysis of action. Thus the victory of either combatant implies the destruction of the other, and thereby also the ruin of itself. Conflict, then, is pernicious and absurd, since each element involves the other and cannot exist without it. But cannot they associate together on the terms of an armed neutrality? Cannot body and soul each live its own life, each respect the interests and requirements of the other, and so exhibit a sort of federal union within the self? To put the question thus still implies that body and mind are more independent than is in reality the case. In matter of fact they are but different aspects of the self, which by a process of abstraction can identify itself now with the one and now with the other. The self looked at from one point of view is the body; looked at from another point of view it is the soul. It is the self alone which has concrete truth. A loose federation, therefore, between body and mind would be not

success but failure. It would not be the establishment of friendly relations between powers that are naturally independent, but rather the disruption and dismemberment of what is essentially one. This unity of the self is a primary characteristic of human nature ('the rational soul and flesh are *one* man'), and must be kept steadily in view. Instead, then, of first positing an unreal severance of body and mind, and then attempting to discover a *modus vivendi* for them—instead, that is, of saying what is untrue and then trying to evade the consequences—it would be well to adhere to this central truth of humanity, and to ask, What is the one self, of which body and mind are the different aspects? The answer may be given in the one word 'spirit.' Spirit is the comprehensive unity in which mind and body, thought and feeling, are reconciled and combined. Spirit is the true and essential personality of man; the spiritual life is the life lived by man in the wholeness and integrity of his nature. In comparison with spirit, mind and body are mere dislocated fragments of



humanity. And the distinctness which they now possess, the clearness of their severance from each other, is itself the result of sin. The failure of man was his failure to maintain this central unity unimpaired, his attempt to identify himself exclusively with one or other of its different aspects, ignoring or denying the existence of the other. The Fall of Man was a fall from his true nature as a spiritual creature ; and since man, as spirit, was made in God's image, it was also an act of apostasy from God. Man, as a spirit, was at first in full and unclouded communion with God the Father of spirits. Without the exercise of the discursive understanding he enjoyed that which is now the distant goal of moral, religious, and scientific effort, namely, an eternal life in which the spirit of man is in communion with God as the source and sum of truth. The Fall was in its first phase an act of rebellious self-will, undertaking the conduct of life and the search for truth through severance from God. Morally, it was the repudiation of the fact of sonship and the adoption of the principle of

lawlessness; intellectually, it was the substitution of mind for spirit. Instead of the intuitive contact of spirit with Him who is the truth, we now have the laborious, discursive, piecemeal operations of the understanding, adding and comparing and inferring and conjecturing. The Fall was thus a real fall. It was not a transition from ignorance to knowledge, but a transition from a higher to a lower form of knowledge, from the insight of the spirit to the inferences of the understanding. It was, in fact, a disruption of the unity of the spirit, a disintegration of spirit into the differences of mind and body. He who before had been a single-centred spiritual creature in immediate contact with a spiritual creator, chose to turn rather to the dissection of himself; and the result of this dissection was the antithesis of mind and body. Identifying himself with mind, he takes up an attitude of outsideness and 'otherness' to body. Body, which was an essential element in *spirit*, is a stranger, an alien, an object of curiosity to *mind*. And so man, as mind, investigates body, and dis-

covers that through body he is a part of nature, with a kinship to the brutes, with antecedents and connections to be examined; and a past that can be partially recovered. He has resolved his original unity of spirit into a dualism of alien elements, a material element and a rational element; and this schism which he has produced in himself is the source of his unhappiness. Moreover, as suggested just now, it is a schism which reaches out beyond his own individual self. Having posited body in antithesis to reason, he proceeds to posit nature in antithesis to God. For nature is body writ large. It is the material aspect of truth which has been forced into a false abstraction, and endowed with an unreal independence, by the disruption of the spirit. When man was uncorrupted spirit, that which fronted him from without was God, as the living reason and truth of things. But now that man has resolved himself into body and understanding, that which fronts him from without is material nature, *plus* the conception of a maker. God, the divine spirit, who is

the unity of truth, is resolved into a world of nature on the one hand and a presumable creator on the other.

But the Fall was even more than this. It was not merely the false abstraction which thus posited body in an unreal antithesis to mind, and nature in a false antagonism to God. Things could not stop at that point. A crude dualism had been effected. Mind and body stood confronting each through the corruption of the spirit. But a deeper pitch of corruption was reached when man attempted to overcome that antithesis by merging himself in body, by making body the sovereign power, and reason the slave of the passions. It was a crude attempt to re-establish a unity of nature by sacrificing the higher of the rival elements to the lower. Thus the first stage in the Fall was the disintegration of spirit into body and mind, and the second stage was the enslavement of mind to body. It appears in the twofold form of intellectual self-will and moral degradation, as described both in Genesis and by St. Paul in the



first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. St. Paul well brings out this double nature of the Fall, and shows that its fatal effects were also twofold. Intellectually it issued in vain reasonings and a darkened understanding; man's unaided efforts after wisdom resulted in the folly of putting nature in the place of God. But, inseparably connected with this, there was a moral lapse into naturalism, a glorification of natural desires, tending to sink still lower into unnatural depravity. Man, dissatisfied with mind as a substitute for spirit, resorts to animalism as a substitute for mind. Such was the Fall: the introduction of schism and discord into man's nature, the substitution of conflicting elements, militant one-sidednesses, for the primal unity of the spirit. And the subsequent history of man is the history of his struggles to transcend that dualism and find peace and truth once more, struggles which are enshrined in the development of Religion and Politics, Art and Science. All this development is subsequent to the Fall, and is the effort to meet its consequences and overcome the

discord which it introduced. Having forfeited his immediate contact with the truth, man had to grope after it by the patient toiling and scheming of his reason, creeping slowly and painfully forward until he reached once more the threshold of the spiritual, and was enabled to be again admitted to the spiritual life.

And here we must avoid a serious mistake. The Fall must not be sought as a phase or event in the history of man's development. It was rather that which made his actual development both possible and necessary. The Christian doctrine of the Fall, following a sinless state, has nothing in common with the legends of a Golden Age. It does not tell us of a decline from a higher to a lower grade of human culture. It *does* explain to us how any gradual culture of man's mind and conscience came to be required. In the eyes of Christianity the course of human development has ever been upwards from the lower to the higher, but the original condition of this development itself was man's fall from the spiritual state. The Fall

was not a process by which a civilised man became a barbarian, but the process by which a spiritual man became a natural man, and thereby entered upon the course of development from savagery to civilisation. This is beautifully expressed in the following lines from the 'Dream of Gerontius : '—

Woe to thee, man ! for he was found  
A recreant in the fight ;  
And lost his heritage of heaven  
And fellowship with light.

Above him now the angry sky,  
Around the tempest's din ;  
Who once had angels for his friends,  
Had but the brutes for kin.

O man ! a savage kindred they ;  
To flee that monster brood  
He scaled the seaside cave, and clomb  
The giants of the wood.

With now a fear, and now a hope,  
With aids which chance supplied,  
From youth to eld, from sire to son,  
He lived and toiled and died.

He dreed his penance age by age ;  
And step by step began  
Slowly to doff his savage garb,  
And be again a man.



And quickened by the Almighty's breath,  
And chastened by His rod,  
And taught by Angel-visittings,  
At length he sought his God ;

And learned to call upon His name,  
And in His faith create  
A household and a fatherland,  
A city and a State.

Such progress was right and good. It started from the dualism of mind and body, and refused to acquiesce in the supremacy of body over mind. It was man's struggle to establish the mastery of mind. But at the same time this struggle was accompanied by the growing conviction that he could only attain success, or win salvation, in so far as he was something more than mind. The real goal was not the subjection of the body to the mind, but the redemption of the body and its co-ordination with the mind through the restoration of a spiritual unity.

We are now in a position to glance at the psychology of man as engaged in this process of historical development. ' Spirit, soul, and body '

(πνεῦμα, ψυχὴ, σῶμα) are enumerated as constituent elements by St. Paul.<sup>1</sup>

Ψυχὴ seems to mean what we should call *sentient life*, the life of an animal organism ; and so, the whole group of powers, functions, and impulses which are natural to such an organism. Thus it is closely bound up with σῶμα, body ; ψυχὴ and σῶμα together make up the nature of man as an animal. And it is just because man is something more than an animal, that the adjective ψυχικὸς has a bad meaning in the New Testament. It is used by St. Paul in sharp antithesis to πνευματικὸς, spiritual. The ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος confines his view to the sphere of the visible and tangible. Anything ideal or spiritual is foolishness to him. The word, in fact, has very much the same meaning as σαρκικὸς, carnal. Both refer to a degenerate nature of man ; so far as the terms are distinguished, ψυχικὸς would seem to describe a more developed and self-assertive form of evil. Σαρκικὸς refers rather to immoral actions

<sup>1</sup> 1 Thess. v. 23.

or desires; *ψυχικὸς* to the immoral theory which attempts to justify them. *Quâ σαρκικὸς*, the man does wrong; *quâ ψυχικὸς*, he declares wrong-doing to be 'natural' or inevitable. The one state is enslavement to the body; the other is its corollary, denial of the spirit. But the expression *σαρκικὸς*, which is frequently used, is often made to include in itself the more special significance of the rare word *ψυχικός*.<sup>1</sup> Finally, an intellectual faculty, a mind or understanding, is of course involved in this degenerate life; but it is an understanding which has been degraded by the service in which it is enlisted. Its existence is made explicit in such expressions as *νοῦς ἀδόκιμος*, or *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*, 'a reprobate mind,' 'a carnal mind.'

*Σῶμα*, body, is a neutral term, applicable to man

<sup>1</sup> The adjective *ψυχικός* is only found six times in the New Testament. Four of these passages are in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians (ii. 14, xv. 44, twice, and 46). In all of them the word is opposed to *πνευματικός*, and is translated 'natural.' In the other two (James iii. 15 and Jude 19) it is translated 'sensual.' In the former it is applied to the wisdom which descendeth not from above; and in the latter it is explained as unspiritual ('sensual, having not the Spirit').

either in a sinless state or in his fallen condition. Its special sense is fixed in various passages by the adjective which qualifies it. The *ψυχικὸν σῶμα*, natural body, is the body of materialised man, subject to death and corruption. The *πνευματικὸν σῶμα*, spiritual body, is the body of man restored and renewed in the resurrection-life. Sometimes, instead of an adjective, a qualifying expression is added to fix the meaning, as in *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου*, *σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, *σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως*, and even *σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς*, 'body of death,' 'body of sin,' 'body of humiliation,' 'body of the flesh.'<sup>1</sup>

*Πνεῦμα*, spirit, is the highest and truest nature of man; it is man as he once was, as he ought to be, and as he can be through the work of Christ and the indwelling of His Spirit. It is a unifying principle, gathering up all the elements and powers of man's nature into a single whole. The body,

<sup>1</sup> Romans vii. 24; vi. 6; Philippians iii. 21; Colossians ii. 11. In Colossians i. 22, the words 'in the body of his flesh' are used to express the *physical* body of Christ as distinct from His *mystical* body, the Church, mentioned in verse 18. See Light-foot, *in loc.*



with its bodily life and impulses, is drawn up and purified and made instrumental to the life of the spirit ; it becomes a spiritual body. The old discord ceases. The spiritual life is the life which is really 'natural' to the body, since the body is no longer an independent and gluttonous animal, but a partner in a single spiritual personality. It is sensuality which is unnatural as well as blasphemous. It is unnatural because it rends asunder the one orderly and harmonious human life, the life of the spirit ; and blasphemous, because this spiritual life is the image and reflection of the life of God. Man, then, as made by God and as re-made in Christ, is a spirit, with a spiritual body and a spiritual understanding. The latter is often implied and included in the comprehensive expression *πνεῦμα* ; it is, in fact, simply spirit on the intellectual side. Where, however, special emphasis is to be laid upon it, it is called *νοῦς*, and appears as the discerning, 'interpreting' capacity, unfolding the nature of that inner and essential communion with God in which the life of the spirit consists.

‘If I pray in an unknown tongue, my spirit prayeth, but my understanding is unfruitful. What is it then? I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also.’<sup>1</sup>

One is struck throughout, in reading St. Paul, by the small importance attached by him to ‘reason’ as such, as opposed to the supreme importance attached to it in most ancient and modern systems, and by the disappearance of the familiar contrast of ‘body’ and ‘mind.’ Reason is assumed as a matter of course in each of the typical lives, the degenerate life and the true life; but it occupies a subordinate position in each of them. The spiritual life includes a capacity of discernment; and the carnal life includes a corruption of that capacity. But the crucial antithesis is not between the understanding and the body, but between the spiritual life, in which a spiritual body and a spiritual understanding are implied, and the carnal life, in which a moribund body and a reprobate understanding are equally implied. Instead of a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 15.



false and superficial contrast between two complementary elements in human nature (the body and the understanding), we get a deep and ultimate contrast between two opposite states of will, in each of which those elements of human nature are present, but by each of which they are used for opposite ends.

The spiritual and the carnal, each with their instruments and accessories, are the facts which are contrasted. And it is in this doctrine of the spirit in antithesis to the flesh that the originality and the truth of the Christian philosophy of man consists.

St. Paul was not one of those thinkers who quietly acquiesce in the antagonism of mind and body as an ultimate fact, and whose ideal of humanity is either the triumph of the former over the latter, or else a 'patchy compromise' between the two. To St. Paul the triumph of mind over body would have been an utterly unmeaning phrase. How can a *νοῦς ἀδόκιμος* triumph over a *ψυχικὸν σῶμα*? How can the *φρόνημα σαρκὸς* govern and

subdue the *σάρξ*? They are far too closely associated in a common degradation. The mind as we know it has only come to be such through its enslavement to the body; and, on the other hand, the body has only been invested with its spurious show of independent reality through the rebellious mutiny of mind. No; a corrupt body can be neither vanquished nor guided by a degraded mind. Satan cannot cast out Satan; the blind cannot lead the blind. Man can only live his true life by recovering his spiritual endowment, in which body and mind may be once more united, and by which they may be purified. And the restoration of the spirit was the work of Christ.

In order to understand the significance of that work, we must conceive as clearly as we can, from the side of man, the nature of the need. This need was, as suggested above, nothing more nor less than the remaking of man as a spiritual being, the restoration to him of that spiritual nature which had been marred and degraded in

the Fall. That was the problem ; and the character of the problem imposed two conditions on any solution that was to be satisfactory. First, the restitution could only be effected by a creative act. The unaided efforts of men themselves could never have accomplished it. The Fall was the rending asunder of man's spiritual nature, and his consequent alienation from a spiritual God. And subsequent history had emphasised and confirmed these facts. The Law had convinced humanity of weakness, of inability to observe a spiritual code of commandments. And the moral struggle itself had borne witness in the same direction. For the moral struggle was a contest of rival elements, an attempt on the part of a naturalised reason to control a group of animalised desires, an attempt on which it entered without credentials and without authority, an attempt in which it was foredoomed to the failure of the sons of Sceva.

Of course, men could still do something to help each other. A feeling of human sympathy

prompted much noble philanthropic work, in which the more generous minds attempted to make life a little less miserable and comfortless for others. But this materialistic philanthropy was in no sense an answer to the problem. The problem was : How can the spirit of man be restored to its eternal life of union with God? And materialistic philanthropy does not touch this question. It takes the sin and misery of the world as a given fact, necessary and inexplicable, and tries to make the conditions of life in it a little less intolerable. It wages war on untrapped sinks and defective dust-bins. Its watchwords are thrift and sanitation. Its ideal is a state of society in which every citizen shall subscribe to a provident dispensary, and be a member of a benefit society and a burial club. The progress of society through the increase of material comfort and the diffusion of useful knowledge, this is its aim and principle. It deals in averages and statistics. The individual is an instance of economic laws, an item in scientific classifications. If we ask : What of the infinite



nature and the infinite destiny of each of these individuals? such philanthropy is speechless. Brought face to face with *the* pressing problem of humanity, it has no answer to give and no remedy to propose. It hovers on the circumference of man's degradation, and never pierces to the centre of the mystery. It does what it can to meet the effects of sin, but shrinks from attempting to eliminate the cause. Moreover, a vague sense of this deficiency leads it more and more to lose sight of the value of individual personality. It feels that it can do very little for the individual, and so tends to ignore and disparage him, concentrating its attention rather on the evolution of the race than on the salvation of the man. But, as opposed to this philosophy of despair—for such it is, in spite of the air of complacent optimism which it usually assumes—Christianity is occupied with the nature of the individual man. To Christianity the crucial question is not: How can the naturalised life of man be made more endurable under existing circumstances, or under such a change of circumstances

as may be effected in the course of generations? but rather: How can this naturalised life be abolished, and its place taken by a spiritual life like that which man possessed at the beginning? Christianity is not behind any other system in the importance which it attaches to hygienic and educational reform, or in the zeal with which it has tried to accomplish them. Only it refuses to allow such reforms to be severed from spiritual reform, just as it refuses to allow the bodily life and desires to have an independent nature and value of their own. Man is one, and man is spirit, with a spiritual understanding and a spiritual body. This is the fact which must govern any attempt at restoration, and it is a fact which condemns ignorance and vice with unequalled authority, since in the light of this fact they become, not merely foolish and impolitic, but wrong and impious. Man, then, can only be raised effectively if he is raised in one piece and as a spirit. And this spiritual restoration was only possible through a creative act. Mere repentance was, as St. Athanasius argues,



insufficient for the work. Sin had weakened and corrupted the power of man's will, and repentance could never by itself restore a capacity which had been lost. 'If there had been sin only, and not a consequence in the form of corruption, repentance had been well. But if, when the transgression had once made a start, men were forced into a condition of natural corruption, and had lost the grace of living in the image of God (ἡ τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα χάρις), what was to be done? What was wanted to recall men to this grace but the Word of God, who at the beginning had made all things out of nothing?'<sup>1</sup> And, secondly, the notion of a restoration implies that the continuity of the human race should be maintained. There was to be a re-creation of sinful man, and not a fresh creation of a sinless race. What was needed was that 'flesh and blood which did in Adam fail, should strive again against the foe, should strive and should prevail.' The original creation was from without; the re-creation must be effected within the series of human history.

<sup>1</sup> *De Incarn. Verb.* vii. § 4.

It must be the endowment of fallen man with a power to rise from his fall and regain his spiritual personality.

The two conditions of success, then, were that the act should be (1) superhuman, and (2) within the line of man's development.

‘In the fulness of time God sent forth His Son, born of a woman.’ In these words St. Paul describes how both conditions were fulfilled. The superhuman nature and the human birth of Christ are both affirmed, and both were necessary to the performance of His work. In a similar sense St. Athanasius writes: ‘For this reason the incorporeal, incorruptible, immaterial Word of God comes into our world, descending to it through His love, and to manifest Himself to us. . . . Seeing that all men had become liable to death, pitying our race, and having compassion on our weakness, and condescending to our corruption, refusing to brook death's mastery over us, lest the work which the Father had wrought upon men should be destroyed and come to nought, He takes

to Himself a body, and a body not alien to our own.' <sup>1</sup>

What, then, was this work of Christ, so far as it affected and transformed human nature? That is the question with which in this connection Christian philosophy is concerned. Its interest lies in man; it is content to view the redemptive act from the side of man, leaving to theology the speculations which centre round the Godhead. Shortly, then, we may describe Christ's work by saying that the divine Son identified Himself with a degraded humanity, and thereby restored to humanity its relation of Sonship to the Father. And this work of atonement subdivides itself into two facts: the fact of the Incarnation and the fact of the Resurrection, a complete identification of Himself with humanity, and the maintenance of His own divine Sonship unimpaired. First came the Incarnation. This was accomplished by His human birth, by His earthly life, and by His death upon the cross. In all three combined we have a

<sup>1</sup> *De Incarn. Verb.* viii. § 2.

single process, the process by which He made Himself completely man. It is, I think, a mistake, and one which has had unhappy consequences, to confine the Incarnation to the *birth* of Christ. This treatment gives an undue finality to what was but the first step in the process whereby He took our nature upon Him. A result which was really effected by the birth and life and death of Christ is thus ascribed solely to the first, and the consequence is that the significance of His life in the scheme of salvation is apt to be ignored, and the significance of His death is apt to be distorted. His death was the finishing of the sacrifice, of His condescension to our humanity, which had been begun in His human birth and continued in His human life. And, then, secondly, came the Resurrection, in which mankind, thus united to Christ, was raised from the dead to a new life of freedom and righteousness. Through the Incarnation Christ had descended to the level of man; through the Resurrection man was carried up to the presence of God. In the two together the great work of



the Atonement was completed. But we must consider each a little more in detail ; and, first, the Incarnation.

By the birth of Christ, which was the first step in that Incarnation, human nature was made the vehicle of a pure and spiritual life. Creative spirit put on the form and fashion of a creature ; in Christ the body was made once more a spiritual body ; the course of the corruption which had reigned in it was arrested ; the plague was stayed. And this was much, but it was not all that was required. Christ by His human birth was perfect, spiritual man ; but, by the very perfection of that spiritual manhood, was out of touch with a manhood which was carnal and degraded. The birth, taken by itself, would have been merely a stupendous, incomprehensible fact, but not a renovating power. The Son of Man must do more than be born as a human creature. He must take humanity with its weakness and its sins. It was by His human life that He took to Himself the weakness of humanity, identifying Himself thereby

with the sickness and the weariness and the sadness of the world. And the life thus lived went far to make Him very man, as the gracious child, born to a stainless human nature, grew into the man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. But underlying the weakness of humanity, as its cause and origin, there was the more baffling disease, the deeper mystery, of sin. Sinfulness, too, must somehow be received into His nature, if He was to be truly and indeed the Son of Man. Spiritual humanity was His at birth; suffering humanity had been won in the course of that earthly life; sinful humanity had still to be made His own through the agony of Gethsemane and Calvary. Only then had He conquered the whole field of our fallen nature, only then was the Incarnation finished. And He took to Himself the sin of man without forfeiting His own spiritual sinlessness; for He took it in the form of its desolating consequences—alienation from God, and death. By a stupendous act of love He steeped His spirit in the sin of others, felt its defilement and cor-



ruption as the defilement and corruption of Himself, and in the horror of that feeling was sundered from His union with the Father. And, further, He stooped to death as the natural outcome, the sign and symbol, of human sin. Death came by sin. Sin was the disruption of spirit, and the naturalising of the body; death was the dissolution of the body as a natural phenomenon. In submitting to death, then, He outwardly and visibly made man's sin His own. In this way Christ's death was a vicarious sacrifice. Being sinless, He was essentially free from the law of death; but, having received the sense of sin into Himself in order to make His humanity complete, He further submitted to death as the external consequence of sin. Just as He had first forgiven the paralytic's sin and then healed his body, so here He vicariously receives the curse of human degradation, first inwardly in the agony of Gethsemane, then outwardly on the cross of Calvary. He died instead of us, for He died in consequence of *our* sins; He who knew no sin was made sin for us.

In this way sin as well as sorrow was assumed by Him together with His raiment of flesh and blood. Then at last He had descended to our level ; the first part of His work was done, He was made man in all the fulness and completeness of the word ; that was finished.

Secondly, the Resurrection proved that in spite of the completeness of that Incarnation, His divine power was unimpaired. It proved that He had taken the manhood into God, and had not converted the Godhead into flesh. The manhood with its weakness and corruption had been assumed in its integrity, but the nature into which it had been taken proved itself divine. The Resurrection was thus the crowning action in the work of Christ, that to which all the others were preparatory, and without which they must lose their meaning. If Christ's work had ended with His death, it would have failed as far as the re-creation of man's nature was concerned. The death without the Resurrection would have implied, not our at-one-ment with God, but His

own estrangement from the Father. It would have implied that the burden of humanity had proved too heavy for Him, that it had crushed and destroyed His own divinity, that man's reunion with the Father had not been accomplished, that we were yet in our sins. Salvation is put within our reach not by one portion of Christ's work, but by that work as a connected whole. Historically, the death and Resurrection were, of course, distinct events, but as a redemptive agency they are indissolubly connected. Strictly speaking, it is not the death of Christ, but His Resurrection after death, which enables us to 'die to sin.' We escape, that is, from bondage to sin through the power which Christ's Resurrection possesses to put a new life within our reach. He dies with us as sinful and death-stricken creatures, descends to the lowest depths of our degradation, that we may rise with Him as the glorified and life-giving Christ. 'He died for our sins, and rose again for our justification.' It is in His death, as the Son of Man, that we can receive Him ; it is through His communi-



cated life, as the Son of God, that He enables us to die to sin. We thus tend to sever the grace of His passion from that of His Resurrection. But the human and the divine are inseparably bound together in Christ; and thus it comes about that in receiving Him in His passion we may be said to die to sin. 'Our old man is crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin' (Romans vi. 6). Christ's Resurrection is implicit in His passion, and therefore by being united to the dying Christ we gain the new life which is hid in God. This fact adds a new truth to the reception of Him in the Holy Eucharist. On the one hand we receive Him there in the depth of His condescension, as the sin-bearer with whom sinners may have immediate contact; but yet He whom we thus receive as the death-stricken son of man is also the eternal and righteous one, who rose from death because it was not possible that He should be holden of it. If the first fact fills us with comfort, the second must inspire us with fear. He

comes to us there in the fulness of His perfect purity as a testing and refining fire, smiting us with pain and anguish as He burns away our vile passions and kills our selfish life. Christ dies with us, but we are also to die with Christ. He dies with us in His vicarious sacrifice; He kills our 'natural' life by His inherent righteousness, and in killing that natural life endows us with new spiritual powers.<sup>1</sup>

Thus it is through our union with Him as the suffering and risen Son of Man, in whom the true capacities of man have been restored, that we put away sin and win the life of righteousness. Through that union we become once more spiritual creatures in communion with God the Creator, without ceasing to have our place in the general series of human development. The continuity of human history is preserved unbroken, only a new power has been bestowed upon it. 'As many as

<sup>1</sup> 'O easy and indulgent doctrine! To have the bloody cross reared within us, and our heart transfixed, and our arms stretched out upon it, and the sin of our nature slaughtered and cast out!'—Newman on *Justification*, vii.

received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God.' How this union with Christ is effected by individuals will be considered in the next chapter ; but we must now attempt to confirm and establish the view here taken of the work of Christ by considering a different interpretation of it.

This interpretation<sup>1</sup> attempts to dissociate the moral ideas of the Christian faith from the historical facts on which it is founded. The moral ideas, we are told, are the really important thing, and they may be treated without reference to the particular way in which they came to be enunciated. Historical matters of fact are the mere setting or framework in which they are enshrined. The historical genesis of the ideas has an archæological interest, but is independent of the eternal and universal significance of the ideas themselves. The great moral idea with which Christ has enriched humanity is the idea

<sup>1</sup> See T. H. Green's *Lay Sermons*, and Pfleiderer's *Hibbert Lectures*,



of unselfishness, the idea of dying to sin and rising again to a new life of righteousness. This idea had its historical setting in the story of the work of Christ; but it is itself independent of that setting. The death and resurrection of Christ are valuable not in themselves as historical facts, but having occasioned the enunciation of the idea which was involved in the narrative. Moreover, the idea of a new life, arising from the abandonment of sin, loses nothing of its truth and validity, if the matters of fact with which it was involved should turn out to be unhistorical. In such an event Christianity would actually gain rather than lose; it would become all the more 'spiritual' through ceasing to be 'supernatural.'

Such is the interpretation, which gains plausibility from the earnestness and eloquence with which it has been urged. But on a very little examination the plausibility disappears. There are two fatal objections to it. First, the moral idea in question was *not* a new one. And, secondly,

the main object of Christianity was not to put forward any fresh moral idea at all. First, then, the injunction, 'Die to sin, and rise to righteousness,' was no novelty. It means simply 'Cease to do evil and learn to do well ;' or, more simply still, 'Be unselfish instead of selfish.' And this was a new idea ! It was an idea which had occupied and agitated and harassed the minds of men ever since the Fall. It had been the common starting-point for moralists of every age and country. And not only the essence of the idea, but also its representation under the figure of a 'new life,' was perfectly familiar. This notion of a new life had been enunciated by Hebrew prophet and psalmist, had expressed itself in the painful initiations of Buddhism, and had been embodied in the form of Eleusinian mysteries and Pythagorean brotherhoods. If the value of Christianity depends on the novelty of this 'idea,' Christianity is an imposture.

But, secondly, Christianity never pretended that it was a new idea, never, in fact, came forward

as an inventor of new ideas. What it really offered was not a new moral law, but power to keep the old one ; not a fresh set of copy-book maxims, but a more abundant spiritual life. No new precepts were required. Men knew perfectly well that they ought to be good and unselfish, that they ought to rise again to a perfect life. But they couldn't do it. Their position is expressed with the greatest clearness and insight by St. Paul. They recognised that the moral law was holy and just and good ; but they had no power to keep it, to make it prevail over that other law in their members, the law of a body that had become carnal and sold under sin. And so, the good that they would, they did not ; but the evil which they would not, that they did. And the weakness and misery of this position ring out in the despairing cry, 'O wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?' That was the problem to be solved. The demand was not for a figurative moral maxim, but for a power that could deliver, a power which should strengthen

men to keep the law which they knew, and in which they delighted after the inward man.

Men were in a condition of ἀκρασία or incontinence, knowing what was right but through weakness failing to do it, a patent and obvious state of mind that had much exercised the Greek philosophers, who had first discussed it at length, and then, having no remedy to suggest, had denied that it existed. Christianity met the problem by the offer of a spiritual power through which man might act up to his knowledge of the right. And this power is the power of Christ's Resurrection, whereby humanity, which could not lift itself, was lifted from the death of sin to the new life of righteousness.

It is vain, then, to attempt to sever the moral idea of Christianity from the historical fact in which it is rooted. We may cordially assent to the assertion that the whole value of historical events is in their ideal significance. But in many cases part of that which the idea signifies is the fact that it has been exhibited in history. The



value and interest of the conquest of Greece over Persia lie in the significant idea of freedom and intelligence triumphing over despotic force ; but surely a part, and a very important part, of the idea is the fact that this triumph was actually won in an historical past, and the encouragement for the present which rests upon that fact. So, too, the value to us of Christ's Resurrection lies in its immense moral significance as a principle of life ; but an essential part of that very significance is the fact that the principle was actually realised by one in whom mankind was summed up and expressed, and by whom therefore the power of realising it is conferred on all who receive Him.



## III

## ETERNAL LIFE

A TRUE life is restored to the human race in Christ. But what is its general character? how does it mark itself off from other kinds of life? What is its attitude to men and things? and how is it appropriated by each individual man? In a single word we may describe it as an *eternal* life, in the sense of absolute or complete. An eternal life is a life which has wholeness, comprehensiveness, order; a life in which heaven and earth, the ideal and the real, have met together; a life in which the various rays of truth and intuition are gathered to a single point; a life both mystical and practical, giving a solid and systematic expression to the most purely spiritual conceptions.

Christianity is an 'absolute' philosophy, in that it vindicates the singleness and trustworthiness of truth, refusing to force its elements asunder into unnatural severance. The ideal, the spiritual, is not banished to another world, or regarded as a harmless but unprofitable theme for visionary minds. And the life on earth is not described as 'material,' 'relative,' 'phenomenal,' as cut off from all contact with genuine reality, as swayed for a time, and then destroyed, by natural forces and necessary laws. By Christianity the two elements are fused in an absolute union. The eternal life has all the actuality of earth combined with the spirituality of Paradise. It is, indeed, this combination of elements, and the completeness which results, that is the meaning of the word eternal. Eternity is not the same as indefinite duration; as has been often pointed out, it is symbolised in the circle, not in the straight line endlessly produced. Eternity is not the negation of a time-limit, but the negation of chaos and disruption. Everlastingness is a mere corollary from the proper

meaning of eternity. Eternity includes far more than the barren conception of a life that never ends (mere endlessness, as in the case of Tithonus, may be a curse and not a blessing); it points to the positive character of the life as a reason for its endlessness. The eternal life *can* never cease, because it is in union with God, and an expression of God's own attributes of order and completeness. The eternal life, as we know it and may possess it now, is the earthly life lived in the sight of God in heaven, through union with one in whom earth and heaven were fused and reconciled. 'This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.' 'This is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son.'

In the light of this conception, full justice is done to the visible world, its glorious beauty, its inexhaustible interest, its humour and its pathos. The world of nature is not regarded with suspicion and reserve, as a garbled copy of some unknow-

able real essence ; it is the direct expression of the glory and the handiwork of God. And the men and women who move up and down upon it are no puppets of mechanical forces, whose evolutions excite only the evanescent interest of a Punch and Judy exhibition ; they are the deepest mystery of all in a world of mystery ; the source and object of their life is the same Spirit who made the world, and union with Him, through all the educating variety of scene and interest, is the essential purpose, the explanatory law, of their existence upon earth. Every detail of their lives has an ideal value, a pathetic, often a tragic, significance. The enthusiasm which spends itself on apparently commonplace occupations ; the humour which contrasts the homeliness of their surroundings with the infinity of their destiny ; the fury which from time to time turns upon those surroundings in a mistaken protest against the limitations they impose ; the heroism of love and self-sacrifice which renounces the present life altogether in the intensity of its faith, the reality of its grasp on the



unseen,—these and countless other facts gain their explanation, and their justification or correction, in the Christian doctrine of life eternal. And this eternal life is just the *spiritual* life, which, from the point of view of psychology, was described in our last chapter. Harmony, concrete unity, integrity, are its characteristic notes throughout. Body and understanding, visible and unseen, real and ideal, are the complementary elements which it holds together in itself.

Further, it is through the *sacramental* principle that this eternal, spiritual life is appropriated by individual men. This follows, in fact, necessarily from the nature of Christ's work. In the person of Christ, divine Spirit mingled with created matter, in order to find and to rescue our materialised human nature. And this Incarnation of the Word was not on the level of ordinary facts which come into being and then pass away. The fusion of spirit with matter was lifted from the sphere of mere past historical events, and was constituted an eternal truth, through the perpetual



reunion of the man Christ Jesus with the Father in the unity of God the Holy Ghost. And because the union of the material with the spiritual has thus more than the archæological and sentimental interest of a perished event in a distant past, because it has the permanence of an eternal fact, presented in God the Holy Ghost under different guises to successive generations ; therefore the renovation of man through Christ is continuously possible. Through the eternal relation of His manhood to the Father, in the unity of the Spirit of life, He evermore makes all things new. No longer, indeed, could there exist for man the immediate contact of a pure spiritual creature with the immaterial nature of God. That was forfeited for ever at the Fall. The God to whom man can now have access is not a God who reveals Himself only as pure creative Deity, but a God who has taken the material creation into Himself, and from whom, therefore, a perpetual gift of spiritual grace can be transmitted to a materialised humanity. It is through Christ that we receive

this gift of the spiritual. Christ's complete and eternal manhood is a constant bond between God and man. The Incarnation is the greatest of sacraments, being a perfect union of the material and the spiritual; and in the life of union with Christ this sacrament is repeated. We cannot have a direct union with God as pure Spirit. But we may have a direct union with Christ as man; and, through this human nature in Him, we may have access to the Godhead. 'No man cometh to the Father but by Him.'

The eternal life is thus necessarily sacramental because it depends upon the reception of spiritual grace by creatures of a material nature living in material surroundings. And this reception was made possible through the completeness of His Incarnation. It is through the flesh and blood of His human nature that we have contact with Him. And so we find that it is from the side of this human nature of flesh and blood that He offers Himself to mankind in the institution of the Holy Communion. 'Take, eat, this is My Body.' It

was as the Son of Man that He offered Himself to men. There they might touch Him, and by thus touching the humanity, which was the hem of His garment, might receive also the virtue of His spiritual power. Only through the outer garment of His flesh could men gain communion with His Spirit. The Holy Communion is thus a perpetual witness to His manhood, the very occasion on which it was instituted testifying to the thoroughness of His Incarnation, to the perfecting of His manhood through agony and death. In what relation, then, does the whole sacramental life stand to the special Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist? Does the sacramental life depend on the sacramental act? or does the sacramental act gain its significance from the sacramental life? On this subject it is fatally easy to hold an exaggerated view in either direction. If we say that eternal life depends entirely on the reception of the Holy Eucharist, we shall be turning that Sacrament into a sort of magical charm, dispensing men from efforts of their own. If we say, on

the other hand, that the Holy Eucharist is *merely* typical or symbolical of a spiritual life which consists in the general imitation of Christ, we shall be eliminating that attitude of dependence and receptivity which is the essence of all true worship.

But the two views are really complementary and not antagonistic. The second presents Christ to us as an example to be copied with all the powers and activities of our nature. The first presents Him as the source of life, from whom these powers and activities are themselves derived. The one tells us to imitate the life of Christ ; the other tells us that only through a personal union with Christ can we gain the strength to do so. The one says, Apply your will to follow the example of Christ's human life, and then you will receive His spiritual gifts. The other says, Join yourself in worship to Christ Himself, and you will then be able to follow His example.

Will and worship are both necessary to a perfect union with Christ's human nature ; and the

divine gift which flows from such a union will appear both in a stronger will and an intenser spiritual life.

The Holy Communion is thus, on the one hand, *symbolical* of an act of will ; and it is, on the other hand, the *reality* of an act of worship. It is symbolical of an act of will. It gathers together, sums up, and expresses all the efforts and aspirations of the practical working life, all the endeavours to bring that life, even in its most secular departments, into harmony with the earthly life of Christ. The Bread and Wine are a type of Christ's humanity ; and the reception of them symbolises the union of our humanity with His. But, further, the Holy Communion has the essential reality of an act of worship. The earthly Jesus is the source of spiritual life just because He is also the glorified Christ. It is through the presence of the Godhead in the Eucharist that our union with  
e manhood becomes a renovating power. His personality cannot be rent asunder ; His twofold nature demands at once our adoration and our



attempts at imitation ;<sup>1</sup> in following Him through the paths of the world we must at the same time, with St. Peter, confess Him as the Christ. Only through this combination of will and worship can we unite ourselves to Him as the perfect Man, who is also the life-giving Son of God. Only thus can we receive to the full His gift of spiritual life, through which we shall be able to imitate Him better.

Such, then, is the eternal life, a sacramental life, closely bound up with the Eucharistic service, in which it is symbolised and from which it is in part derived. The sacramental life is, in fact, an extension of the Holy Eucharist, just as the Holy Eucharist is a perpetuation of the work of the Incarnation. And the sacramental principle colours the whole Christian view of men and things. It is in the sacramental life that the redemption of the

<sup>1</sup> As Dante sees the two natures of Christ reflected alternately in the eyes of Beatrice :

Come in lo specchio il sol, non altrimenti  
La doppia fiera dentro vi raggiava,  
Or con uni, or con altri reggimenti.

*Purg.* xxxi. 121-3.

body is effected, and its impulses, powers, and passions made organic to a pure and undivided manhood. And so, again, in the light of this same principle, the institutions of society become channels or vehicles of spiritual life. Commercial and civic associations gain a higher value as representing the co-operation and helpfulness of men with each other as fellow-citizens in a spiritual kingdom. The very existence of the Church, as a visible and organised society, loyal to an unseen spiritual head, is the clearest proof of these higher potentialities of social institutions. The redemption of institutions follows indeed the redemption of the body. They, like the body, had been lowered and degraded in character through isolation from the spiritual. They had become a mere arena for the rivalry and competition of men in the selfish pursuit of material wealth. Only it is a remarkable fact that this degradation has been excused and defended in the case of institutions long after it has been condemned in the case of the body. In *their* case, severance from the spiritual has been declared to be necessary

and right, when in the case of the body it was recognised as sinful. And yet there is no ground for the differences of treatment. The dogma, for a long time complacently accepted, by which trade and commerce were exempted from the sway of religion and morality, and made subject to 'business principles' and 'economic laws,' as they were euphemistically termed, is just as false and blasphemous as the distinction which severed a man's body from his spirit, and ascribed an independent value and dignity to bodily lusts and appetites. The two cases are exactly parallel. And so, if the body is to be a yoke-fellow with the spirit in the unity of a spiritual life, it follows that those business connections and transactions, by which men aim at bodily food and comfort, must also be in harmony with the laws of the spiritual nature. Friendship and co-operation, as between brothers in Christ, must take the place of hatred, variance, emulation, and the other 'works of the flesh,' which exclude from the kingdom of God, whether they are committed in business or in private life.

We have seen that eternal life is the fusion of two elements, the spiritual and the material. We may further illustrate its nature by asking what is its exact relation to (1) the spiritual life as perfected in the world to come ; and (2) the ordinary earthly life with its multitude of varying interests ?

First, then, it is most important to insist that the sacramental life and the heavenly life are not different, as is too often thought, but are one and the same spiritual life at successive stages of its development. The sacramental life is the spiritual life, as begun on earth ; the heavenly life is the spiritual life, as continued in the presence of God hereafter. The spiritual is the element of identity which persists throughout and connects the two together as phases in the growth of a single life. And yet this connecting link is commonly ignored, and in popular theology a sharp contrast is drawn between the present life and the future life, as things different in kind. 'Future happiness' is regarded as something quite distinct from the life that now is. And so the questions arise, What is



the relation between the two? For whom is this happiness reserved? and why? And various answers are elaborated. The simplest of them all is to be found in the theory of unconditional predestination,<sup>1</sup> which says that the happiness is for those whom God wills to select, and adds that the reason for this selection is inscrutable, and bears no relation to merit in any form whatever. Secondly, we have a theory diametrically opposed to this: the theory that the happiness in question is *earned* or *bought* by individuals, at their discretion, through certain modes of action in the present world. In its extremest form it teaches that the price required is to be paid in the form of pain and misery voluntarily undergone, and that the Deity will recompense self-inflicted and unmeaning anguish by endless enjoyment in another world. Pain, simply as pain, and not as discipline to character, is here regarded as a passport to future pleasure. This view is probably a relic of old pagan devil-worship, in which the Deity is conceived as an en-

<sup>1</sup> See next chapter.



vious and malevolent spirit who rejoices in, and is propitiated by, the sight of human suffering. But it has lived on in Christian times, and has been characteristically softened and modified to express the convictions of a commercial age. It is no longer self-inflicted pain, but the abjuration of certain forms of enjoyment, which is put forward as the claim to future happiness. The world to come is conceived as a profitable investment, which the judicious mind must view with satisfaction and approval. In order to gain so much pleasure for oneself in the future, it is well worth while to submit to slight restraints and abstentions here. The theory is essentially the same throughout, whether expressed in its primitive and barbaric simplicity or in the more refined phraseology of the modern money market. In either form it conceives future happiness as a commodity, which can be purchased by a policy of far-sighted self-interest. Only it is strange that its modern votaries do not see that such a theory, however natural to ancient paganism, is horribly out of place in Christianity; strange

that they do not ask themselves why the Almighty should consent to be a party to such an astounding transaction as is here imagined. Perhaps, however, to raise this question would be considered a mark of impiety. At any rate, we must protest against this popular travesty of Christianity, this degradation of religion to the level of the Stock Exchange. And in the matter at issue we must maintain that none of these bad bridges are required to connect the present life with the future, because there is no gulf to be bridged over. There is no contrast to be drawn between a present life and a future ; the only real contrast is between a spiritual life, in its successive upward stages, and a carnal life, in the various phases of its fall ; between a spiritual life planted here and flowering hereafter, and a carnal life dying here and dead hereafter. Christianity thus transcends the popular distinction between 'present' and 'future' (just as we have seen<sup>1</sup> that it transcends the popular antithesis of 'body' and 'mind'), and substitutes for it the far

<sup>1</sup> See p. 54.

deeper distinction between carnal and spiritual, between a life devoted to self-seeking and one lived in communion with God. It substitutes a qualitative distinction for a merely quantitative one, a difference in value for a difference in time. Time does not affect the question at all, or only does so in the way of completing and developing two fundamental different types.

And, further, the contrast between the spiritual life and the carnal life is sometimes even more sharply defined in the Christian writers by the restriction of the word 'life' to the former of the two. The carnal life, being the negation of the highest capacities of man, is not deemed worthy of the name of *life*; it is in matter of fact the corruption and dissolution of man's nature, and is therefore really *death*. And 'death' it is often called; whilst the term 'life,' without qualification, is used to describe the activity of the spirit. Thus we have here a double transformation of popular phraseology. In ordinary language the present life is contrasted with the future life, and death is

a barrier between them. In Christian language death is the corrupt degenerate existence, false to man's best possibilities, withering now in severance from God, and, unless the decay be arrested, ending in a severance that is final and complete; and life is the spiritual communion with God, begun on earth and perfected in heaven. The contrast between present and future is abolished; the barrier between them disappears; and there remains the one permanent, fundamental contrast, the short stern antithesis of spiritual and carnal, life and death.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is mainly in the writings of St. John that the Christian meaning of 'life' is developed. St. John clearly distinguishes *eternal* from *future* life. The eternal life is, of course, everlasting, but the meaning of the two terms is kept carefully distinct. Sometimes the two truths are mentioned together as complementary facts. 'This is the will of Him that sent Me, that everyone which seeth the Son, and believeth on Him, may *have eternal life*; and *I will raise him up at the last day*' (vi. 40). And a few lines further on: 'Whoso eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, *hath eternal life*; and *I will raise him up at the last day* (*ib.* 54). So, too, in the great declaration at Bethany, mention is first made of a future life after death, and then of an [eternal] life, to which mere physical death is no check or interruption. 'Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in Me



The spiritual life, as lived on earth, is thus the sacramental life of communion with God through Christ's humanity. And this sacramental life grows by a natural course of development into the heavenly life of unclouded union and unhesitat-

shall never die' (xi. 25, 26). Physical death is mere sleep: 'our friend Lazarus sleepeth' (*ib.* 11); continued earthly life is *tarrying till Christ comes* (xxi. 22); eternal life is more than mere continued existence, and is not interrupted by physical death, just as to St. Paul 'to live was Christ and to die was gain.' It is faith in Christ and union with Him which gives eternal life, whether here or in heaven. 'He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life' (iii. 36). 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on Me hath eternal life' (vi. 47). 'This is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent' (xxii. 3). Sometimes the term *life* is used alone. 'I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.' And conversely, 'If a man keep My saying, he shall never see death' (viii. 51). So again, with both terms used in this absolute sense: 'We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren' (1 John iii. 14). Sometimes, again, 'life' and 'eternal life' appear as alternative forms of expression. 'The life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us' (1 John i. 2). 'This is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life. These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God' (1 John v. 11-13).



ing love. A spiritual life lived on earth is thus the root from which the spiritual life to be lived in heaven springs naturally without break or breach of continuity. And it must be added, on the other hand, that those to whom religion is a matter of far-sighted selfishness, who make judicious sacrifices of enjoyment now in order to obtain endless 'rewards' in the future, are really killing in themselves the very germs of that heavenly life which they so fatally misconceive. It is the Judas, and not the true disciple, who sells his Master for a reward. It is true, indeed, that Christ's followers have a reward in heaven; but that reward is the fulness of union with Him whose life they have tried to imitate below, in works of unselfishness and love. To have lived the sacramental life on earth is the condition of living the heavenly life hereafter; or, rather, they are but the earlier and later stages in one life that is continuous throughout.

And, secondly, what is the relation of the sacramental life to the social system of the world in which it is lived? The answer is partly contained

in the very word 'sacramental.' That word by itself implies that the Christian life is not to be lived in isolation from the world with its human interests and ties. Christianity sees in the social system manifold opportunities of service, manifold openings for the fulfilment of duties to the human brotherhood, duties as various and complex as is the life of man. When the earthly life is thus understood, it is a necessary element in the sacramental life. The sacramental life *is* this life of human service, dedicated to Christ and strengthened by the spiritual grace which flows from such a dedication. The perfect life is not the life most entirely cut off from domestic and civic duties, but the one in which those duties are best performed. Christianity insists, indeed, that man may attain to an eternal spiritual life, which far transcends his earthly career alike in its origin and its destiny; but it hastens to add that this eternal life depends upon union with Christ's humanity, and that no union with Christ's humanity is possible except through love and devotion to Christ's brethren.

The crucial point here is that this life in the world, if it is to be thus sacramentalised, must be a life of genuine service, of real self-devotion ; not one which aims at private self-gratification in any form. It is the career of *unselfish* work which becomes the sacramental life by being dedicated to Christ. Self-seeking here or elsewhere, worldliness or other-worldliness, has no fellowship with the sacramental life, because in no sense can it be regarded as a union with Christ's humanity. The sacramental life is rooted in the service of man. Cut off from that service, it is cut off from all communion with the Son of Man. And this service may take the most various forms, according as it ministers to the material or immaterial needs of men. For instance, it may be intellectual as well as practical. It may consist in supplying men with truth, as well as in purifying their hearts, or in perfecting their drains. All who minister to any of the manifold needs of man with reverence and unselfishness are united and bound together in one great cause of human service. And to be



enlisted in that cause in some capacity or other is a necessary condition of the highest life. The *reality* of the service rendered, the purity of the motive with which it is performed, that is the important point. There is an obvious diversity in men's natural spheres of work. None of them, as such, is higher or lower than another. The one thing needful is that each man should act disinterestedly in that peculiar sphere which suits him. Thus the intellectual life may be a life of heroic self-devotion to the good of man; and, on the other hand, the practical life may be corroded by vanity and desire of applause. Each may be good and useful: each may be corrupt and unprofitable. It is the motive which makes the difference. And it is important to see this, since praise and blame are often unfairly meted out. If we are right in blaming the contemplative life of refinement and self-culture, we must blame it not because it is intellectual, but because it is egotistic; not because it is barren of *practical* results, but because it refuses to impart its knowledge as a contribution

to the common weal. *Some* contribution a man must make, and make it in honesty and integrity of purpose, if he is to lead the spiritual life.

In this matter Christianity takes a far richer and wider view than Greek philosophy. Aristotle agrees, indeed, with the Christian teachers that man has, here and now, an eternal life to live, a life which is not fulfilled or exhausted in the activities of an ordinary practical career. He concludes that, *therefore*, the practical life may be dismissed as inadequate, and that the true life of man, the life in which (as far as may be) he becomes immortal, is to be found in intellectual contemplation. The philosopher represents a higher type than the practical man, not on the ground that the philosopher is ultimately the better citizen of the two, making a more valuable contribution to the common welfare of the State, but because he is more self-sufficing, more independent of the State, more free from duties of any sort to his fellow-citizens. A distinction of kind is drawn between the practical and the intellectual. The practical



life, as such, is the lower, and the intellectual, as such, the higher type of existence.

In the eyes of Christianity, both practical work and intellectual work, if unselfishly performed, may be invested with a spiritual character, and become the vehicle of an eternal life. It is not by being intellectual, but by being unselfish, that a man may 'become immortal,' may make himself able to receive the gift of eternal life. And a man is not cut off from such a life by being 'practical.' Be the life practical or intellectual, if it is a life of genuine self-devotion, it may receive a spiritual endowment which imparts a new and eternal significance to its driest details, and gives it the assurance of a perfected development hereafter.

The Christian life is thus spiritual, without becoming useless and inactive. It is supra-mundane in its origin and motives, without sinking into a condition of dreamy mysticism. Through prayer and meditation it holds communion with a Spiritual Being, but a Being who has revealed Himself in flesh and blood, and who makes an immediate

claim on our active service. And so the eternal life is to be maintained, not by absorption in pure thought and abstraction from the things of sense, but by active work in the sunshine and rain of the visible world, where He who is its source and inspiration went about doing good, and lived among men as he who doth serve. The life is spiritual just so long as it acts and works.

But also, on the other hand, its effectiveness as a working power largely depends on its spiritual character. This is so, for instance, in the practical life of beneficence. The life which is most permanently useful in the world is precisely the life which in essence and origin is not of this noisy world, but silent and divine : the life which can look beyond and above the bewildering needs of the immediate present, and has laid hold on the eternal principles which alone contain their ultimate solution. The 'unpractical' man, who sees the workings of *moral* evil in the *material* degradation and misery of the people, and insists that the only lasting remedy is to be found in a

gradual moral education, who communes with the unseen, and gains thereby clearness as to the work to be done and strength in which to do it, who believes that the eternal life of union with Christ, with the self-sacrifice which is at once its condition and its result, is the highest good for others as well as for himself, such is the man whose works live after him as a permanent blessing on the earth. His path is never lost through the tangle of details or the pressure of passing perplexities. A perfect and unchanging ideal is always before him, forbidding any lowering of standards, any evasive compromises, any easy acquiescence in results already achieved. Higher heights are always opening up above him, and he has the strength and the confidence to face them; for he is conscious of himself as an instrument for the attainment of God's end through the methods which God selects and by power which God supplies. He works in the consciousness of an eternal plan, an all-wise system, which is fulfilling itself by means of him, if he acts to the best of his

knowledge and his strength, but which may be hindered by his lack of intelligence or activity. He is aware of a kingdom of God around him and about him ; every part of the work which he does is done in full consciousness of the whole to which it belongs ; and the conception of this wholeness and this kingdom ennobles and transfigures the most commonplace routine work done in its service. Even in the arid and heated atmosphere of boards and committees, even in the crude and disappointing realism of common life, his zeal will neither be hardened into cynicism nor narrowed into priggishness. And he will deal with even the most desperate 'cases' in the strength of a deathless confidence. He will label none as 'hopeless,' the class of the 'incurable' will have no existence for him. Even in the hardened reprobate he knows that unexpected capacities for good may reveal themselves to the keener insight of perfect love, and that, in virtue of such capacities, this world's failures may still be God's successes.

And the spiritual temper is just as necessary



to the life devoted to intellectual work. In itself, the pursuit of truth is a process of becoming, which never issues in substantial achievement. It is an effort 'never ending, still beginning,' towards a goal that cannot be reached. For, by a necessity of our nature, we are compelled to conceive truth as a single system, orderly, coherent and comprehensive, a system in which law and order are supreme, and in which subtle threads of affinity bind all elements together. But, in face of an ideal like this, what degree of attainment is possible, even to the most colossal genius, within the limits of one short, uncertain life-time?

Forerun thy peers, thy time, and let  
Thy feet, millenniums hence, be set  
In midst of knowledge dream'd not yet.

Thou hast not gained a real height,  
Nor art thou nearer to the light,  
Because the scale is infinite.

A sense of the ineffectiveness of such search for knowledge may well produce the 'melancholy' presented to us in Albert Dürer's masterpiece.



But in the light of Christianity all is changed. To Christianity truth is not a far-off ideal which mocks our efforts and recedes as we approach it, but an ideal which has become incarnate, and has entered upon those very limitations of time and circumstance which we deplore. By so doing it has abolished those limitations themselves, and has substituted essential possession for hopeless search.

The ideal of truth is the *incarnate* Word, who in the fulness of His living personality offers Himself to those who are seeking knowledge. Their work becomes in consequence something more than a mere ineffective striving. The essential reality of knowledge is theirs throughout, when they have linked themselves to one who is the creative reason of the universe, one in whom are centred all the different lines of truth which the various sciences pursue. Patience and confidence and energy follow. Patience: for men may well endure to wait for the discovery of some of the details of knowledge, when they dwell in daily communion with the living source of truth. And

confidence : for they know now that there must be a unity of purpose underlying all apparent waste and contradiction, and so can work on with that faith in the rationality of the universe which is so necessary a condition of success in science. And energy : for the pursuit of knowledge becomes a religious work ; it is the act of comprehending and entering into the mind of Christ ; it is transformed into a philosophic *ἔρως*, inspiring its votaries with the enthusiasm of devotion to a person. In the devotion to knowledge, as in the devotion to goodness, the end is with men at every stage. *ἐν ὁτρωοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος*. Completeness marks each item of achievement. Each new fact of knowledge which we grasp has its orderly place and its eternal significance in the ideal whole which dwells continually with us.

It used to be said, sometimes by men who should have known better, that Christianity introduced discord and sickness in place of the wholeness and sanity which marked the Greek conception of life. The main difficulty about

such a statement was that it is utterly unhistorical. Anyone who goes to the Greek writers themselves, instead of elaborating an *à priori* idea of what 'Hellenism' ought to have been, finds them possessed by a strong conviction of the discordant, chaotic character of human life, a conviction which was partly stifled in the keen excitement of political embroilments, but which re-appears in all the deepest thinkers. In fact, those who still wish to maintain the contrast between Hellenic sanity and Christian sickness, find themselves compelled to locate the former in pre-Socratic times, and to include all the best known Greek philosophers in the condemnation which they pass upon the latter. A recent writer, who certainly has the courage of his convictions, finds this ideal of sanity in the scanty and enigmatical utterances of Heraclitus.<sup>1</sup> 'In Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,' he remarks, 'philosophy underwent a change more radical than any other

<sup>1</sup> *Heraclitus of Ephesus*, by G. T. W. Patrick, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in the State University of Iowa, p. 76 *seq.*

in its history, a change that was ultimately to revolutionise all thought, and, through its influence on Christian theology, to enter as a large determining element into all Western civilisation. Heraclitus is the representative of what philosophy was before that change. . . . Socrates represents the birth of self-consciousness. In practising his maieutic art to this end, he little thought that he was giving the death-blow to the most beautiful trait of his countrymen, namely, the instinctive, the unconscious, the naïve. . . . There was another respect in which the fall of man took place in Socrates. The love of beauty and form, and particularly beauty of the human body, characterised all the Greeks until Socrates, but characterises modern people in a relatively small degree. Socrates cared nothing for outward beauty, but, to the surprise of his fellow-citizens, laid all the emphasis upon moral beauty. It may be that the Greeks estimated physical beauty too high ; but the rebound has been too great. Caught up by the genius of Plato, and intensified by the



tenor of his philosophy, and met six centuries later in Alexandria by a powerful current of the same tendency from Judæa, it effected the complete destruction of the Greek idea, and with it, of course, of Greek art. . . . There is still another aspect of the Socratic apostasy, as important as those we have mentioned, and so far-reaching in its effects that it determines modern thought even to the lowest ranks of society. In this movement, begun by Socrates, but perfected by Plato and Aristotle, the central thought of the Heraclitic philosophy was denied, and denied with such power that now, after twenty-two hundred years, it hardly dares assert itself. We refer, of course, to the Platonic transcendentalism. . . . Heraclitus, in a wonderful conception of the world, had abolished every antithesis, and enunciated a system of pure monism. The Socratic school reversed his plan, and set up a dualism of universal and particular, noumenon and phenomenon, mind and body, spirit and matter, which has dominated all philosophy, religion, and literature.'



A writer who incidentally accuses Aristotle of transcendentalism, and Plato of indifference to beauty, has little claim on our unquestioning faith in his imaginative reconstruction of the philosophy of Heraclitus. But there is one grain of truth in the remarkable passage just quoted: the dualism there alluded to did undoubtedly pervade Greek thought after, if not before, the time of Socrates, and was not invented by Christianity. In matter of fact, Christianity abolished it, substituting for it a whole-hearted, single-centred view of man and of the universe. The Pauline view of the spiritual nature, the Johannine definition of eternal life, the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments, these contain the Christian answer to the antitheses and dualisms of Greek thought. It is true that dualistic theories, partly Platonic and partly Oriental, attempted at different times to establish themselves in Christian Theology; but the Church deliberately and successfully rejected them in its determined opposition to Gnostic and Manichean speculations.

Evil, it insisted, did *not* reside in any necessary imperfection of matter, but in the rebellious self-will of man ; redemption was *not* to be found in negative asceticism, but in active consecration ; Christ was *not* a juxtaposition of contradictory principles, but one coherent Personality in which two complementary natures are combined.

We have now considered the meaning of the eternal life, and the relation in which it stands to the life in heaven and to the life in the world. We have seen that it is related to the former as the 'blade' to the 'full corn in the ear ;' that the two are united as phases in the secret growth of a single spiritual life.

And we have seen that it is related to the earthly life (domestic, civic, intellectual) as the seed is related to the soil in which it grows, and isolated from which it would wither and die, since it is to the personality of Christ *on its human side* that we have direct and immediate access. The failure of much so-called mysticism has been due to the attempt to discard the human in aiming at

the spiritual. It is by other paths, through unselfish work in the human brotherhood, by self-devotion to the cause of goodness and of knowledge, that men may lay hold on eternal life. And this self-devotion itself is strengthened and purified through faith in Christ. It is the grace of Christ which endows the spirit of man with the insight and the energy to know and to act aright.

In the light of these considerations, a double splendour is seen to surround the active Christian life, as lived on earth. First, its very activity (moral or intellectual) endows it, through faith in the Incarnation, with a higher, spiritual character. And, secondly, the life which has thus become spiritual is united in an unbroken continuity with the life in heaven. All things in the world thus glow with a spiritual light. The antithesis of secular and sacred is at last transcended, not by materialising that which is divine, but by recognising the potential spiritual value of all self-devotion to charity and truth.

NOTE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE  
OF SPIRIT

‘THERE is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death. . . . For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh ; but they that are after the Spirit, the things of the Spirit. For to be carnally minded is death ; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace. . . . Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. . . . But if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised

up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by His Spirit that dwelleth in you.<sup>1</sup>

Two questions are suggested by the words of this passage.

1. In what relation is the Spirit conceived to stand to God and to Christ? and (2) in what relation to the human spirit? There is also (3) the further question as to the relation of the Spirit to creation as a whole. And, lastly (4), What is meant by the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection?

1. It was only after the incarnate Christ had returned to heaven, that God was revealed in the fulness of His nature as a Spirit, in whom are included the absolute deity of the Father, and the incarnate deity of the Son. The Spirit unites both, and is sometimes called the Spirit of God, sometimes the Spirit of Christ. Both expressions are found in Romans viii. 9, quoted above. For the latter we may compare Phil. i. 19, 'the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ,' and Gal. iv. 6, 'God

<sup>1</sup> Rom. viii, 1 *sq.*



hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts.' Further, in 2 Cor. iii. 17-18, the Spirit seems to be both identified with Christ and distinguished from Him: 'Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Lord the Spirit.' Christ, after His Ascension, is identified with the life-giving Spirit, in whom He is eternally united to the Father, and in whom both Father and Son dwell continually in the hearts of believers. 'I will pray the Father, and He shall give you *another Comforter*, even the Spirit of truth. . . . I will not leave you comfortless: *I will come to you.*'<sup>1</sup> And, again, 'If a man love Me, he will keep My words: and My Father will love him, and *We will come unto him*;' <sup>2</sup> explained further in verse 26: 'The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He shall teach

<sup>1</sup> St. John<sup>xiv.</sup> 16-18.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* 23.

you all things.' So, too, He explains that it was through the Spirit's ministration after His own Ascension, and not in a gross material sense, that men were to eat His body and drink His blood in the Holy Eucharist. 'Doth this offend you? What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before? It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.'<sup>1</sup>

That God is a Spirit is the full and final revelation, in which the revelation of the Father and the revelation of the Son are both combined. It is, in fact, this union of distinctions within the Godhead which characterises the Catholic doctrine of God, and marks it off from Unitarianism on the one hand and Polytheism on the other. The Deity does not consist in blank unchangeableness, nor in the act of change which is involved in the taking of the manhood into God, but in spiritual life, in spiritual personality, within which there are

<sup>1</sup> St. John vi. 61-63.

elements distinct indeed, but in absolute harmony of will and operation. All personality involves identity in difference; and it is in knowing God as a Spirit that we know Him as a Person. And the same truth reconciles the *transcendence* and the *immanence* of God.<sup>1</sup> God the Father is transcendent and separate (χωριστός), dwelling apart in the light that no man may approach unto; but God the Holy Ghost, proceeding from the Father, is immanent in the world, and dwells in the hearts of Christians; and this immanence was made possible by the Incarnation of the Son.

2. It is often hard, in reading St. Paul, to distinguish the indwelling Spirit from the spiritual gifts (πνευματικὰ χαρίσματα) which He imparts, and the spiritual endowment of man which they compose. But this is no difficulty for those who have grasped the Catholic doctrine in its stupendous simplicity. Human individuality is never endangered by the indwelling, but is perfected by it.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Lux Mundi*, p. 95 sq., where, however, the line of argument is somewhat different.

There is, indeed, a danger of our 'quenching' or 'grieving' the Spirit, but no danger of the Spirit turning us into lifeless puppets. And this being so, the difficulty of separating the operations of the Divine Spirit from those of the human spirit which is His home is a fact to be welcomed and rejoiced at. It shows that Christians *can* attain to the perfection of their personality, which consists in freely identifying their wills and lives with the will and the life of God. Human efforts and aspirations are taken up and completed by the Spirit, who assists our weakness and offers up our inarticulate prayers. 'Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.'<sup>1</sup>

3. St. Paul tells us that the dead body laid in the grave is related to the resurrection body as the seed is related to the blade of wheat which springs from it. That is, there is an element of sameness

<sup>1</sup> Rom. viii. 26.



and an element of difference. The man who rises will be connected by an unbroken bond of personality with the man who died, and yet the 'spiritual' body which is raised may be very unlike the 'natural' body which is sown. It need not, for instance, consist of material particles. The spiritual body would be no less a body by being immaterial. *Spiritual* does not mean *bodiless*. The spiritual man is not the disembodied man, but the completed or perfected man; and in this completed manhood body in some form or other is an integral element.<sup>1</sup> Instead of arguing, *Bodily* is the same as *material*, therefore the resurrection of the body is a resurrection of material particles, we should rather argue, Body is implied

<sup>1</sup> 'Incorporales autem spiritus non erunt homines spirituales; sed substantia nostra, id est, animae et carnis adunatio assumens Spiritum Dei, spiritualem hominem perficit' (Irenaeus, v. 8, 2). So, too, Origen: 'Materialis ista substantia hujus mundi habens naturam, quae ex omnibus ad omnia transformatur, cum ad inferiores quosque trahitur, in crassiorem corporis statum solidioremque formatur, ita ut visibiles istas mundi species variasque distinguat; cum vero perfectioribus ministrat et beatioribus, in fulgore coelestium corporum micat, et *spiritualis corporis indumentis* vel angelos Dei vel *filios resurrectionis exornat*' (*De Princ.* ii. 2).



in spirit ; therefore the spiritual man who rises will have a body of his own. So true, indeed, is it that spirit has body, that we only knew God fully as a Spirit after the glorified body of Christ had reascended to union with the Father. The 'body of His glory' is certainly unlike our present 'body of humiliation ;' but it is none the less a body, and such will the Christian's body one day become.<sup>1</sup> If an objection is raised from the appearances of Christ after His resurrection, and in particular from the words, 'A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me have,'<sup>2</sup> it must be remembered that this argument is double-edged. If it is said that the risen Christ could not be *merely* spiritual because He had flesh and bones, we may reply that He could not have possessed flesh and bones in the ordinary sense of a 'natural' body, because He could vanish and appear at will. Perhaps we best represent the facts by saying that the risen Christ possessed a spiritual body, and that, whilst moving among men who were necessarily earthy in their

<sup>1</sup> Phil. iii. 21.

<sup>2</sup> St. Luke xxiv. 39.

nature and perceptions, He from time to time transformed this spiritual body into a natural body, in order to assure them of His personal identity in the only way in which the assurance could be conveyed to them. Such a naturalising was exceptional, and was only effected for purposes of proof. In itself it was abnormal and mysterious: it was not to be taken as a permanent state of the risen Lord. 'Touch Me not, for I am not yet ascended to My Father.' He was essentially spiritual, with a spiritual body that could be spiritually appropriated and fed upon, and it was thus that men were henceforth to touch Him. And so, just as the ascended body of Christ exists still within the unity of God the Holy Spirit, and is by Him communicated to us in the Holy Eucharist, so too those who rise from the dead will be spirits clad in a spiritual body. Two passages from Cardinal Newman may be quoted in confirmation of this view: 'Our own mortal bodies will then be found to contain within them an inner man, which at present exists but in germ, and which will then

receive its due proportions, as the soul's harmonious organ, instead of that gross mass of flesh and blood which sight and touch are sensible of.'<sup>1</sup> 'The spiritual body, how or what we know not, is formed within it, the same as it, yet different in its accidents. Corruption, dissolution, mortality, are but the accidents of the Christian's body, and are separated from it for ever on its rising again. What we see is not the real body, it is but the outward shell; the real body of the regenerate is not material, but spiritual, of which the seed is now deposited within us.'<sup>2</sup>

4. Lastly, in God the Holy Spirit creation as a whole is transformed. Nature was taken back into God through the Incarnation, and has its part in the permanent dispensation of the Spirit. It was man's fall which had sundered it from its Creator; and the Incarnation reversed the fall in this respect, too, that it restored the spiritual character of the natural world. Nature becomes

<sup>1</sup> *Parochial Sermons*, iv. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Lectures on Justification*, ix. p. 243.

the vehicle of spirit. God is seen and approached through the forms of material things. Nature ceases to be a screen which hides God from us, or a veil of Isis which no man can lift; it becomes the plastic gold in which the divine Artificer fashions his eternal ideas.<sup>1</sup> 'The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even *His eternal power and Godhead*.'<sup>2</sup> Nature is reunited to God in a sacramental union. Sacramentalism takes the place of symbolism. Nature no longer conveys mere vague suggestions of another world, but becomes itself a dwelling-place of the Holy Spirit. Now in man alone is this spiritual endowment articulate and self-conscious. Man has received the liberty which comes where the Spirit of the Lord is, though even in man the adoption or redemption of the body is not fully completed. Nature is body on a larger scale, and the same redemption, the same deliverance from vanity, waits for nature as a whole. When man

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 50.<sup>2</sup> Rom. i. 20.



uses his own body entirely as an instrument of the Spirit, when he uses all material things as instruments in the Spirit's service, then nature will again be 'very good,' and will fulfil the purpose for which it was made, the revelation of God's power and Godhead. After the fall nature became a school or discipline for man: 'Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life.' After the Incarnation nature received its own measure of the grace of Christ; cursed for Adam's sin, it is blessed for Christ's atonement; and this blessing will increase according as man, the lord of nature, uses the spiritual freedom vouchsafed to him. 'For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath subjected the same in hope, because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth



in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.' <sup>1</sup>

*Conclusion.*—The above considerations go to show that our ordinary conception of the meaning of *spirit* requires correction. *Spiritual* ordinarily suggests something vague and unsubstantial, something which scarcely has any claim to be considered a 'thing' at all; whereas it should rather mean that which possesses concrete truth, that which is in the fullest sense *real*. Thus the doctrine of God the Holy Ghost is not a shadowy adjunct to the doctrine of Christ. The Holy Spirit is the eternal completeness of the Divine Personality, which was temporarily manifested in the life, words, and acts of the Incarnate Son. It was expedient' that the temporary manifestation should be withdrawn, that the fulness of God's continual indwelling might begin. Again, spirit does not

<sup>1</sup> Rom. viii. 19-23.

{ exist in antithesis to body and in antagonism to matter ; body and matter are the temple or dwelling-place of spirit, and divorced from spirit they lose their meaning and reality.

## IV

## FREEDOM

FREEDOM is an essential attribute of the sacramental life. As such it has been implied in the discussions of the last chapter ; but the subject is so important that it is worth while to deal with it more explicitly. Freedom, then, belongs to man as spirit ; it would be better described as the freedom of man, or the freedom of the spirit, than as the freedom of the will. For 'will' is a term of doubtful meaning. It was often understood as a separate faculty in human nature, the relation of which to its colleagues was left for the most part undetermined. And when the tendency to multiply faculties became discredited, the will was generally identified with reason, either pure reason

or reason mingled with desire. Before we state the Christian account of the matter, it will be well to examine shortly the theories held on this subject by two of the greatest modern philosophers, Kant and Hegel. It is through comparison with other systems that the distinctive traits of Christian philosophy become most clearly visible.

According to Kant, freedom belongs to man as intelligence—as a being, that is, who is independent of all natural causation. Man's nature is twofold. On the one side he is a free, supra-sensuous intelligence. On the other side he is a natural phenomenon, an item in the sensuous world, swayed by the laws of necessary causation, the puppet of natural desire. For the moment we must confine ourselves to the former aspect. Reason constitutes freedom, and rational freedom enables a man to aim at other ends than the attainment of objects of desire which belong to the natural world of phenomena. As a natural phenomenon, he would be controlled by natural desire ; as intelligence, he can determine himself



with reference to the pure rational form of the will, and not with reference to its empirical matter. This pure form of the will is, shortly, the consciousness of reason as a bond of connection and source of obligation between all members of the human race. As pure will, a man rises above his narrow, 'natural' selfishness, and asserts his 'universal' or 'objective' nature as a member of a society of rational beings, with duties to all other members of that society. In this sense the pure form of the will is described as the conception of a law valid for all rational beings; a law which is expressed thus: 'Act so that the maxim of your will may be a principle of universal law-giving.' And free action is action performed from reverence for this 'pure legislative form' of the will; or, in other words, action governed by respect for the rational personality of others. The deep conviction of the sacredness of human personality forms the undying merit of Kant's moral system. 'Treat humanity in yourself and others always as an end and never as a means' is the more intelligible

formula given in the *Metaphysic of the Foundation of Morals*. In virtue of their rational endowment, all men belong to one great 'kingdom of ends,' each citizen in which is governed by respect for the rights of others. It is a grand conception, to which we shall return, and which we shall try to restate in a different form. As stated by Kant himself, it is involved in inextricable difficulties. His whole ethical system rests on an uncompromising dualism between man as intelligence, where he is a 'Wesen an sich,' and man as a 'Sinnenwesen,' subject to the necessary causation of desire. Human freedom is found entirely in reason, and requires the absolute severance of reason from the sphere of empirical desire. But, as Kant admits, natural or empirical desire must be felt in order that action may take place. How then does freedom still assert itself in action? It does so by insisting that, when we follow these natural desires, we shall follow them not exclusively in our own interest, but in the interest of all. But, further, if these desires are to be realised

in the interest of all, they must be desires which are felt by all. Thus the lower and more common a desire is, the better is it adapted to serve as an exhibition of the moral law. This certainly strikes us as very extraordinary. This universalisation of the commonest desires seems a very round-about way of expressing our respect for the personality of others. We inevitably ask, 'Why cannot we assert our freedom by acting directly and immediately for the good of others?' Kant anticipates this question,<sup>1</sup> and answers that it is impossible to do so, because in that case we should be acting from mere empirical desire, and not from the pure form of the will at all. The only guise in which direct philanthropic sentiment could appear in an act of freedom would be as a natural desire felt universally by all men (which it obviously is not), and capable of being gratified universally for all. And even then the will, in order to be free, would not be determined by the philanthropic sentiment itself, but by the charac-

<sup>1</sup> *Practical Reason*, i. § 8, note 1; p. 40 in Kirchmann's edition.

teristic of universality, the pure legislative form, which must indeed have some common natural desire to deal with, but to which the character of that desire is absolutely indifferent. Free action in the Kantian sense requires the presence of two elements: first, *common* desires, contemptuously classified together as natural events in the way of causation; and, secondly, intelligence, which wills their realisation impartially for all.

It is not hard to see that this lands us in a sort of 'universalistic hedonism,' in which the pleasures are sought under the influence of natural law, and are universalised by a forcible restraint, which requires them to be shared with others. Here there is no freedom, but disruption and schism; no harmony of a united nature, but a dualism of reason divorced from desire, and desire degraded to the level of common natural appetite. There is, in fact, in Kant's theory, a double negation of freedom. Freedom is negated, first, in the 'natural' or 'necessary' character ascribed to desire; and, secondly, it is negated in the unnatural universali-



sation of impulses which, as thus conceived, are essentially self-seeking. Kant's failure to maintain the freedom of man was thus due to the great gulf which he assumed to exist between reason and desire.<sup>1</sup>

To bridge over this gulf was one of the greatest achievements of Hegel, whose brilliant and subtle analysis of the will may now be considered. With Hegel the will is free as long as it exists. Will without freedom would be an unmeaning expres-

<sup>1</sup> It is true that in the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* he makes an effort to bring the two words together. He there declares that freedom can produce its own effects in the world of sense, that in the production of these effects it may be brought into collision with the processes of natural causation, and that such natural processes may be employed by freedom in the realisation of its rational ends (p. 35, Kirchmann's edition). But, in the first place, the very possibility of the practical causality to be thus exercised by freedom is declared to be incomprehensible; and very justly, since it requires the causality of freedom to be at the same time an item of natural causality, whilst still determined by intelligence, although we have just been told that the great gulf between the two domains cannot be bridged over. And, secondly, there is no definite object to be realised in this incomprehensible operation. Reason is to achieve results; but no result can be achieved unless desire is taken up into reason and converted into a rational motive, and this remains impossible with Kant.



sion.<sup>1</sup> Freedom belongs to will in the same sense as weight belongs to body. So, instead of asking, When is the will free? we should ask, When does will exist? The answer is that the will exists, or is free, as long as it is the fusion of two complementary elements.

The first of these is pure self-consciousness (*das reine Denken seiner selbst*)—that is, a man's knowledge that *he* is something distinct from the needs, impulses, and desires which belong to him, and something, again, independent in a sense of the conditions and circumstances in which he finds himself. Pure self-consciousness is thus marked by indeterminateness; it is, in Hegel's words, 'the absolute capacity of abstracting from every determination in which I find myself, or in which I have placed myself;' and, again, 'the flight from all positive content, as from a limitation.' This abstract universal is one side or element in an act of will. But in itself it is negative, featureless, and void of content; and, in fact, much the same

<sup>1</sup> See the introduction to the *Rechtsphilosophie*.

as Kant's 'intelligence.' But Hegel, unlike Kant, refuses to allow that this empty universal constitutes freedom. It must be supplemented by a second element, which may be comprehensively called the particular, including all the various differences and distinctions which make up the content of our various volitions. The particular gives definiteness to the will, supplying it with an aim and object. Taken by itself, however, the particular is as unsatisfactory and negative as we have seen the pure universal to be. It is characterised by contingency and fortuitousness. And if the will were to unite itself fortuitously to the particular impulse or desire, it would not be really free ; for it would be negating its other aspect of universality and identity. The man who is under the sway of the mere particular, acts capriciously, but not freely. He chooses, indeed, but only chooses one particular in preference to another ; he has disintegrated himself into a chaos of particulars ; he is not realising his own universal identity in them, but is sacrificing it to them. He

thinks that he is free, and grounds his pretension on the fact that 'he does what he likes ;' but this very fact, Hegel declares, proves that he is *not* free. Such slavery to caprice is the very opposite of freedom. It is, in fact, the essential mark of moral evil.

Now, as distinct from this abstract universal and this equally abstract particular, an act of genuine will, which is the same as an act of free will, is one in which the two elements are fused together into a single whole. Freedom, or will in its concrete truth, is not the indeterminate universal, and not determination by particular caprice, but *self-determination*, in which the particular is taken up into the universal as a necessary element in a systematic scheme, or a means of realising a rational end. Instead of a dualism giving us a blank universal on the one hand, and a chaos of particulars on the other, we thus have a single orderly whole made up of properly articulated and related parts.

Hegel gives us here a discriminating analysis

of the will as it exists in all self-conscious action ; but it really leaves untouched the crucial problem of freedom. We are still at the threshold of the inquiry. We take the will, as thus constituted, and proceed to ask, When and under what conditions is it free? To repeat, in reply, that it is always and necessarily free, since will is freedom, proves too much and means very little. This freedom of will, *quâ* will, is a merely formal freedom, possessed by all who pursue consciously any object whatsoever. It embraces all action performed by people who are not positively insane ; it belongs to the most saintly heroism in common with the most deliberate and cold-blooded rascality. A freedom like this, ignoring all the positive characteristics in which real freedom consists, is 'a night in which all cows are black.'

We have here an instance of a fallacy which meets us so often in Hegel, the fallacy of ascribing at the outset an unreal independence to the different elements in self-conscious activity, in order that a triumphant and ostentatious union between them



may be subsequently effected. So here, the particularity of the will, the complete isolation of desire from self-consciousness, is a fact that never occurs, at any rate outside a lunatic asylum. If the particular were really severed altogether from the universal, the man would either be a monomaniac, if this happened in the case of one special set of impulses, or a lunatic if it happened with regard to all his impulses. A kleptomaniac is just a man in whom a particular impulse has been divorced from the control of self-consciousness, a man in whom the particularisation of the will has really taken place. The only case in which the particular can be said to have triumphed over the universal is the case of insanity, and not the case of depravity. And as long as the thief, or anyone else, continues to act consciously in view of the satisfaction in question, so long the will must be said to exist in its fusion of elements ; and so long on Hegel's principles the man must be said to be free.

But it might be argued from the Hegelian standpoint that, although the two elements of the

will exist in such a case, they are not properly balanced or perfectly adjusted. The universal here merely ratifies the demands of the particular, performs a purely ceremonial function, reigns but does not govern. And this is perfectly true, but it is only a fragment of the truth. The whole truth is that no perfect adjustment or balance of reason and desire is possible so long as reason and desire are regarded as the only and ultimate constituents of a man's nature. So long there is a mere see-saw of alien elements, one up and the other down : an alternation of despotism, when reason coerces desire, and anarchy, when the mob-law of desire prevails.

Now there are two ways of meeting this difficulty, the Hegelian and the Christian. The Hegelian solution abandons the individual altogether. According to it, will in its perfect adaptation of elements must not be sought in the individual spirit at all, but in the spirit of the state ; or rather in the world-spirit which develops itself in and through the spirits of the states ; or rather,

again, in the restful self-contemplation of Absolute Spirit. Now so far as such an answer involves the admission that, in the individual, no interaction of reason and desire can yield true freedom, we should heartily endorse it. But how the world-spirit (assuming its existence) is better off in this respect it is difficult to see. To judge from its public performances in history, it seems to find considerable difficulty in the adjustment of its elements. Nothing is gained by substituting world-spirit for individual spirit. The original difficulty is here repeated on a larger scale; the problem is not solved, but merely magnified. And if we are told that these elements are ultimately reconciled, not indeed in the evolution, but in the self-contemplation of Absolute Spirit, we must answer that this has nothing whatever to do with the human will as displayed in action. The very outlines of the question at issue have here disappeared in a luminous mist of dialectic.

We may now proceed to the Christian view, having gained from Hegel two important truths:

first, the interaction of reason and desire in every act of will; and, secondly, the inability of this interaction to produce freedom for the individual agent. The meaning of the second principle is simply this, that passion is not purified by merely being rationalised. Under the manipulation of reason desire ceases to be blind appetite, but does not thereby become moral. The man is free, not when his impulses are intellectualised, but when they are sanctified. The solution of the difficulty (or, from the practical side, the salvation of man) is not to be found in reduplicating the dualism of desire and intellect on a larger scale, but by transcending it altogether; not by subsuming the individual under the Absolute, but by spiritualising the nature of the individual. Formal freedom may consist in the survival of reason; real freedom is the restoration of spirit. Formal freedom means that a man acts consciously, acts in view of a satisfaction of his nature, whatever that satisfaction may be; real freedom is the power to live the life of the spirit, the life of communion



with God and of the disinterested service of man. Real freedom does not allow the individual to be lost in the spirit of the state or the spirit of the world; it insists that the state and all other institutions of the world are the machinery in which and through which the individual spirit purifies itself by works of unselfishness and love. Real freedom is citizenship in a spiritual kingdom of ends, in which each human personality is included, and in which a sense of the value of that personality is the stimulus to patriotism and self-sacrifice. And in this respect the significance of the work of Christ is that it restored to each individual the power of attaining the genuine freedom of a spiritual personality, and thereby also the power of serving his fellow-men with the reverence due to spiritual beings, and with the zeal and enthusiasm of purified desire.

Freedom in the Christian sense is thus found in the harmony of a single centred manhood, within which reason and desire work smoothly to-

gether for the attainment of a common end, body and mind being reconciled in the unity of a spiritual nature.

Freedom, then, is involved in the unification of human nature through the new birth of the spirit. And, moreover, as it is spiritual in its origin, it is spiritual also in its object. Its origin dictates its object. Being itself derived from union with the Son of Man, it must of necessity aim at the good of the human brotherhood. Freedom, in a word, is the power of devoting the united forces of a spiritual nature to the furtherance of a spiritual kingdom including all mankind.

From the fact that freedom depends on union with Christ, two other great principles are derived. First, freedom must be within the reach of all, without distinction or reservation, since all are to unite themselves to Him as the universal Son of Man. And, secondly, this freedom, like all spiritual grace, is a gift that may be accepted or refused. St. Paul expressly states the possibility of its rejection, the possibility of quenching the Spirit

treasuring up wrath by hardness of heart, of his being himself a castaway.

And yet these principles, simple and obvious as they are, have been denied respectively by two great erroneous doctrines, the doctrine of unconditional predestination, and the doctrine of efficacious grace. The doctrine of unconditional predestination declares that particular persons are selected from their fellows and pre-ordained to salvation by an arbitrary fiat of the Creator ; and the doctrine of efficacious or irresistible grace maintains that the power of Christ overrules and forces the human will. We have here a great twofold fallacy which has had dark and desolating consequences, but which nevertheless sprang from the distortion of a noble instinct. It had its source in a deep sense of sin, a profound conviction of weakness and unworthiness ; it was a perversion of the deep humility which is so striking in St. Paul. St. Paul had felt profoundly that in himself—that is, in his flesh—dwelt no good thing, and that whatever he had effected was done not by him but by Christ dwell-

ing in him. St. Augustine, who, like St. Paul, had passed through a momentous crisis altering all his life, expresses a like feeling in an exaggerated form. The other side of the truth—namely, man's responsibility for accepting and using the proffered gift of grace, a side which St. Paul had kept steadily in view—is lost sight of in St. Augustine's impetuous self-abasement. God's eternal purposes had worked upon him, had called him from sin and were maintaining him in holiness, in a manner and with a power absolutely independent of himself. A predestination, unaffected by act of his, had marked him out for mercy, and an irresistible grace was holding him up.

Such is the inner argument expressing St. Augustine's personal experience. The explicit reasonings which are its counterpart and support are scarcely less interesting. In the early treatise *De Spiritu et Littera*, which abounds in great truths finely expressed, the argument is this: God gives us the power to believe Him and trust Him; but this power is not compulsion. It is a power



which is to be used by man through his own volition. All power comes from God, but this cannot be said of all volition; otherwise God would be the cause of evil as well as good. Free will exists as 'a middle force' (*vis media*) which can be turned to opposite ends. It is a natural endowment conferred upon the rational soul at creation (*naturaliter attributum a Creatore animae rationali*), and is the capacity of accepting or rejecting the divine influences of Gospel teaching or of good desires within. All these influences, as well as the power of obeying them, come from God. Whether a man obeys or not depends on his own volition (*voluntas*), which is rooted in the free will (*liberum arbitrium*) given to him as a rational being. How is it, then, that these influences are rejected by one and followed by another? This question is scarcely touched in the *De Spiritu et Littera*, but the later treatises answer it by emphasising the degradation of the Fall, whereby man's natural endowment was corrupted and ruined. Free will, as part of that endowment,

shares in the common ruin. Hence those who resist God do so because they have forfeited their power of free choice, and are the helpless slaves of corruption. They are left by God's justice in the weakness and wickedness by which all human nature is infected. So, too, those who follow the divine motions are not acting of their own free will, but are being acted upon by God's mercy which they passively receive, and by which they are irresistibly controlled. Thus the 'vis media' of natural freedom disappears in the general degradation of the Fall, and we are left with the sharp antithesis of a helpless and corrupt humanity and an irresistible uncovenanted grace.

It is not difficult to see that St. Augustine was wrong in regarding free will as a part of man's 'natural' endowment. On that theory it follows logically that freedom is forfeited at the Fall, and that irresistible grace is the only means of salvation. Freedom is not an attribute of the *anima rationalis*, but is due entirely to the communicated grace of God; it belongs to man not as rational but as

spiritual, and man was spiritual at the beginning through the grace of union with God. Grace was the source of freedom. Afterwards, in so far as grace was extended to fallen man, it came to him as a partial restoration of his freedom, a partial emancipation from the darkness and slavery of sin. It did not treat him as a puppet, but helped him to be a man again. Grace and freedom are connected as cause and effect, and should never be dissevered. Their severance and alienation is the flaw in each of the extreme theories. In the Augustinian doctrine grace takes the place of defunct freedom; the cause works without producing the effect. In Pelagianism freedom is set up as independent of grace; the effect boasts that it can dispense with its cause.

But the Catholic doctrine recognises no such anomalies. It declares that without grace there is no freedom; and that the more grace man receives, the greater is his freedom. Pelagianism was wrong in supposing that freedom can go a certain way by itself and then requires the support of grace.

Grace is not a *reward* for good works done, but a *power* enabling us to do them. ('Ideo datur, non quia bona opera fecimus, sed ut ea facere valeamus; id est, non quia legem implevimus, sed ut legem implere possimus.'—*De Spir. et Lit.* 10); it is not only a *cure* for sin but also a *preventive*. ('Sanat ergo Deus non solum ut deleat quod peccavimus, sed ut praestet etiam ne peccemus.'—*De Nat. et Gr.* 25); it gives the power of forming good desires, as well as the power of giving effect to them;<sup>1</sup> and, lastly, it is grace which supplies that very freedom of choice which can be used for the purpose of rejecting grace. It is through the grace extended to him that a man is free to take or refuse the fuller grace which Christ offers him. Freedom, in

<sup>1</sup> 'Si quis per naturae vigorem bonum aliquid, quod ad salutem vitae aeternae, cogitare ut expedit aut eligere, sive salutari, id est evangelicae praedicationi consentire posse confirmat absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti, qui dat omnibus suavitatem in consentiendo et credendo veritati; haeretico fallitur spiritu, non intelligens vocem Dei in Evangelio dicentis: *Sine me nihil potestis facere*, et illud apostoli: non quod idonei simus cogitare aliquid ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est.'—Second Council of Orange, § vii., given in Bright's *Anti-Pelagian Treatises of St. Augustine*, p. 384 seq.



whatever degree it exists, is a prerogative of the spiritual nature, and with the rest of that nature is entirely a gift from God. 'So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.' The power of praying, as well as the answer to prayer, is due to grace. It is through grace that a man can turn to Christ in order to receive from Him a more abundant gift of grace.<sup>1</sup>

And, on the other hand, this more abundant

<sup>1</sup> This is admirably stated by St. Augustine himself in *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. xxx., where he declares that grace heals the soul from the flaw of sin, and that from this healing flows the freedom whereby alone the law is kept: 'Liberum ergo arbitrium evacuamus per gratiam? Absit: sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus. Sicut enim lex per fidem, sic liberum arbitrium per gratiam non evacuatur sed statuitur. Neque enim lex impletur nisi libero arbitrio: sed per legem cognitio peccati, per fidem impetratio gratiae contra peccatum, per gratiam sanatio animae a vitio peccati, per animae sanitatem libertas arbitrii, per liberum arbitrium iustitiae dilectio, per iustitiae dilectionem legis operatio. Ac per hoc, sicut lex non evacuatur sed statuitur per fidem, quia fides impetrat gratiam qua lex impleatur: ita liberum arbitrium non evacuatur per gratiam, sed statuitur, quia gratia sanat voluntatem qua iustitia libere diligatur.' This clear, true, and Pauline account of the matter was distorted by the assumption that freedom is a natural endowment, and the inference that, as such, it perished in the Fall.

gift of grace is itself a fuller measure of freedom. The more grace a man receives, the greater comes his capacity for doing right. As grace increases in him, his perception grows clearer, his desires become purer. But it is always *he* who perceives and desires what is right. Grace does not turn him into an automaton. Grace is the perfection of individuality, and not its abolition; the source of freedom, and not its negation.

It follows at once that there is no such thing as irresistible grace. A man retains the power of apostasy from God even when God's grace has long been working in him. In such a case, of course, freedom is distorted into mere license and self-will. But then freedom would not be freedom if it were incapable of misuse. When God endowed His creature with the grace of a rational and spiritual nature, He endowed it then with the power of apostasy from Himself. Without this power of apostasy free loyalty would be impossible. It was thus through the grace of communion with God that man was originally

to sever himself from God. And the same principle holds good now. All freedom is due to grace; the more grace a man receives, the stronger and more habitual becomes his loyalty to God, but this loyalty is always free, and may be given up for the wilful caprices of lawlessness. This principle is enforced again and again by the collects of the Church. They tell us that without God nothing is good or holy; that from Him proceed holy desires as well as good counsels and just works: that His grace must prevent as well as follow us. But they all proceed on the assumption that the grace is a grace of restored freedom and not of substituted force, that *we* are to give effect to the good desires which God puts in our hearts by using the strength which God supplies. They agree throughout with the language of the 10th Article, which says that 'God's grace works with us,' not *instead of us*.

This doctrine of grace in its relation to freedom is an essential point in St. Paul's philosophy. He is always insisting on the twofold fact, that with-

out grace we can do nothing, and that grace is the restoration of freedom. On the former principle he proclaims the universality of sin, and of the weakness and corruption which it engendered : the natural man could no longer keep God's Law ; to boast of works apart from faith was vanity ; it was through faith in the free promise, afterwards fulfilled in Christ, that the saints of the Old Covenant attained to righteousness ; it was through no merits of its own that the new Israel was called to its high prerogative ; salvation was ' not of works but of Him that calleth,' ' not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.'

And, on the other hand, this gift of grace is a gift of life and liberty. 'The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death.' 'Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.' The Spirit of Christ had saved men from the letter of the Law, which was nothing but a sentence of death, and from the fleshly mind, which was death itself ; the Christian



was called to freedom, a freedom which he must not misuse, a freedom in which it was his duty to stand fast, a freedom in which the material universe may one day share, when creation is 'delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.'

In a word, the Pauline doctrine is that man's natural state is bondage to sin, with a darkened understanding and corrupt desires; that the grace of Christ gives him spiritual freedom, and that he is responsible for the use he makes of it. It is a doctrine which on its two sides is true to the two great declarations of Christ Himself: 'Without Me ye can do nothing;' and, 'If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.'

Lastly, we may notice, as a corollary from the above, that, since grace is the cause of spiritual freedom, it enables men to become *good*, in the ordinary sense of that word. By their own unaided efforts virtue could never have been achieved, the Law could never have been fulfilled. But the grace of Christ, in restoring our freedom, puts

sanctification within our reach. It was the central object of Christ's work to justify us in God's sight by making us holy and acceptable to Him.

In what relation, then, does *justification by faith* stand to *sanctification by obedience*? They are often regarded as rival principles, resting respectively on the notions of *imputed* righteousness and of *meritorious* works. The Lutheran theory of justification regards with horror the very idea of human righteousness; boasting must be excluded, and this can only be effected if it is understood that man, even after Christ's redemptive work, remains vile and miserable. Righteousness, indeed, he must have, in order to obtain salvation; but it is the righteousness of Christ, imputed to him by a forensic fiction, and not in any real sense his own. Through the merits of Christ's atonement we are called good, whilst we remain bad; we are said to be that which we are not and can never become—a strange result, indeed, to ascribe to the work of Him who is the Truth. The opposite view, in its recoil from

Lutheranism, regards good works as not only possible and necessary, but as meritorious too, holding not only that they are pleasing to God, but also that through them we earn, and have a right to, our salvation. But justification and sanctification must not be thus severed from each other. They are both together involved in the reception of Christ through the Sacraments, by which we receive, first, forgiveness in respect of the past, and, secondly, strength for the life that is to follow. By the former gift our sins are wiped out, our account is cleared, we are pronounced righteous, are made God's children ; by the second our sanctification is gradually accomplished. Both are effected by Christ's Atonement ; 'He died that we might be forgiven ; He died to make us good.' Justification by faith does not consist in the forensic substitution of Christ's righteousness for our own, dispensing us from individual efforts after holiness ; it consists in the pardon of past sins, freely accorded to those who unite themselves to Christ. And good works constitute no ground for boasting, no claim for a

reward ; we have nothing which we did not receive ; we are unprofitable servants ; the good which is done is done by Christ dwelling in us, and would have been infinitely greater but for the hardness and slowness of our hearts, whereby His gracious will is thwarted and opposed. The indwelling of Christ through the Holy Spirit justifies us from past sin *and* sanctifies us for the future. By a single process we are forgiven and renewed, the forgiveness being a pledge of the renewal, and the renewal a result of the forgiveness. We are pronounced just because we are to be holy, and we become holy through the same indwelling of Christ which gave us our forgiveness. 'Justification,' then, 'comes *through* the Sacraments, is received *by* faith, *consists* in God's inward presence, and *lives* in obedience.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Newman on *Justification*, Lecture xii. I have closely followed Newman's admirable exposition in the above section.



## V

## VIRTUE

A MORAL philosophy, or theory of a man's duty to his fellow-men, resolves itself into an answer to three questions. First, what is the class of people to whom duties are owed? Secondly, what is the nature of the good which is common to them and which it is the virtuous man's duty to promote? Thirdly, what is the power which is to incite the man to virtue or the pursuit of such a good? In other words, moral philosophy has to determine, first, the area; secondly, the object; and thirdly, the motive of duty. And these three subdivisions of the inquiry are closely inter-connected. The answer given to one of the above questions logically prejudges the answers to be given to the others. For instance, if the area of

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duty is unduly narrowed, the conception of the good to be realised within those bounds will inevitably suffer, and the purity of the motive be to some extent corrupted. And, again, any theory which, in widening the pale of duty, comes to take a low view of the nature of the common good will be unable to exhibit any powerful motive force at all. These two typical cases may be briefly illustrated from the Greek morality and Utilitarianism respectively, before we proceed to consider the Christian doctrine on the subject. In Greek ethics the area of duty was bounded by the limits of the city-state. The common good which the virtuous man had to promote was the welfare of a small and select band of fellow-citizens, who enjoyed the advantages of good looks, noble birth, ample leisure, and a comfortable competency. Within this charmed circle duty was recognised and virtue flourished. Outside it, they were simply non-existent. The citizens of any given Greek state openly professed the most cynical immorality, and made expediency their one law of action, in

their relations to the rest of the world. Hence, there is ghastly contrast between their home and foreign polity, between the Athens of Pericles' speech—all freedom, generosity, and refinement—and the Athens of the Melian debate, with her policy of cold-blooded and calculating cruelty. The high-minded Greek citizen felt no obligations towards the citizens of another state, much less towards the slave population, by whose labour he was supported. His fellow-citizens alone had claims upon him. In what, then, was the common good, the good common to him and them, conceived to consist? The answer follows logically the view taken of the area of duty, and is—civic security and civic splendour. The good man is the man who performs his function as a member of the city-state. And this performance of function may be exemplified in the devotion of the soldier or the statesman; or, again, in the public-spirited use of private fortune. In these ways the common good could be advanced. The state could be made to triumph by force or fraud over all its

neighbours, and could then be glorified by beautiful buildings and sumptuous theatrical displays. Such an ideal of civic duty must have been full of charm and attractiveness. And yet, on the other hand, the conviction of the Greek philosophers, that this practical self-devotion was *not* the highest life open to man, is very significant. It was a conviction which resulted naturally from the unworthy limitation of the field of duty. Moral virtue, thus cramped and confined, was not an adequate expression of man's capacities. The common good was conceived in a thoroughly *bourgeois* spirit. It is a good which consists largely in social position and a balance at the bank. The fulfilment of function requires a 'complete' life. The man must be adequately provided with external 'properties' if he is to play his part on the stage of citizen life. What would happen, we inevitably ask, if this external prosperity disappeared? Could virtuous action realise the chief good if it were deprived of all accessories? This question is never fairly faced by Aristotle, as may be seen from the



contradictions and contortions in which his discussion of Solon's celebrated maxim ends.<sup>1</sup> There is in his conception of the common good a dualism of virtue and prosperity—two elements which are utterly distinct, and which are not fused into a single conception by being merely placed alongside of each other in a definition of the *summum bonum*. It is a dualism which does not trouble him much, being natural to all *bourgeois* views of life. In fact, the only ground for complaining of it in Aristotle is, that Plato had succeeded in transcending it. Plato had remorselessly cut away all the tinsel and gilding of external position and social respectability, and had fairly undertaken to maintain that justice was good, owing to its own intrinsic influence on the soul of man, even if it escaped the notice of both gods and men. Plato's deeper insight made him utterly unable to acquiesce in the municipal ideal. His impatience vents itself partly in dreams of a Pan-hellenic nation, such as had almost become possible at

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, i. 10.

the time of the Persian war, but, more often and more forcibly, in a sovereign contempt for civic life and the exaltation of philosophy. Aristotle, too, in spite of his more practical bent, is convinced of the inadequacy of the practical career; and both philosophers give us a vivid picture of the educated citizen, patriotic and public-spirited at first in municipal matters, but gradually weaning himself from political life, and finding a higher substitute for it in the pure and permanent joys of contemplation. Thus, the value of social self-devotion was impaired by the narrowness of the society in which it could be exercised.

And, thirdly, what was the motive of Greek morality? Why should a man live the virtuous life of devotion to the welfare of the state? The answer is, because his own life would be incomplete and fragmentary unless he did so; because he can only fulfil his function, or achieve perfection, by limiting and adapting his own impulses and desires to the requirement of his citizenship—an answer full of value, and fraught with a suggestiveness

which is far from being exhausted in Aristotle's own presentation of it. With him the motive appears as an intense feeling of patriotism, in which family ties and civic ambition naturally went for much. A man could act, and ought to act, for his family, his friends, his fellow-citizens, and only in so acting could he live a self-sufficing life. Moreover, he could act disinterestedly for them, in so far as virtue was the link of connection between himself and them; in other words, so far as the members of these various associations were regarded as moral agents—a conception which suggests Kant's kingdom of ends, and contains the germs of a development which, as Aristotle candidly admits, would logically extend even to the case of slaves.

The Greek philosopher has here stated two truths of vital importance: first, that it is the selfish, individualistic life which fails and falls short of completeness, the life lived for the whole being alone adequate and satisfactory; and, secondly, that disinterested action is only possible if a moral view is taken of the persons for whom

it is performed. Moreover, we may admit that it was probably owing in great measure to the smallness and compactness of the Greek communities that he was able to state these principles with such insight. But yet, on the other hand, the restrictedness of the area corrupted the nature of the motive. Reverence for the sacredness of human personality, which is the only genuine moral motive, appears in a cramped and distorted shape as reverence for civil personality, respect for political enfranchisement. It issues in a keen enthusiasm for kinsmen, citizens, and friends, but can naturally give no incentive to duties which rest on a sense of the value of personality as such. Truthfulness, or the duty of sincerity between rational beings, and chastity, or the duty of reverence to the body as an element in a spiritual whole, are travestied or ignored.

This objection, of undue narrowness, which we have brought against Greek ethics certainly does not apply to Utilitarianism. 'Every man to count for one, and no man for more than one,' is its great

fundamental principle. The area of duty is as wide as humanity. And what, then, is the nature of the good which is thus common to all mankind? The answer is given in simple and unambiguous terms by Bentham, and is in one word, Pleasure. '*Utility*,' he says,<sup>1</sup> 'is an abstract term. It expresses the property or tendency of a thing to prevent some evil or to procure some good. *Evil* is pain, or the cause of pain. *Good* is pleasure, or the cause of pleasure. That which is conformable to the utility or the interest of an individual, is what tends to augment the total sum of his happiness. That which is conformable to the utility or the interest of a community, is what tends to augment the total sum of the happiness of the individuals that compose it. . . . The *logic of utility* consists in setting out, in all the operations of the judgment, from the calculation or comparison of pains and pleasures, and in not allowing the interference of any other idea. I am a partisan of the *principle of utility* when I

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Legislation*, pp. 2, 3.



measure my approbation or disapprobation of a public or private act by its tendency to produce pleasure or pain ; when I employ the words *just, unjust, moral, immoral, good, bad*, simply as collective terms including the ideas of certain pains or pleasures ; it being always understood that I use the words *pain* and *pleasure* in their ordinary signification, without inventing any arbitrary definition for the sake of excluding certain pleasures or denying the existence of certain pains. In this matter we want no refinement, no metaphysics. . . . He who adopts the *principle of utility* esteems virtue to be a good only on account of the pleasures which result from it ; he regards vice as an evil only because of the pains which it produces.' Subsequent writers on Utilitarianism have introduced some of the 'refinements' which Bentham deprecates, and have been guilty of inconsistency in doing so ; but the School, in so far as it has any coherence at all, has gone solid for pleasure as constituting the common good. Mill, indeed, attempted<sup>\*</sup> to establish distinctions of

kind between one sort of pleasure and another, and thereby committed one of his many acts of philosophical suicide. Bentham had seen clearly what Aristotle had long ago pointed out, that utility is a relative expression, and must therefore refer to something else as the essential good. Acts must be 'useful' for something or other, and this final end, to which reference is thus implied, may appear either as pleasure or as moral goodness. *Χρήσιμον δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή.* Now, of these alternatives Bentham had unhesitatingly selected pleasure as the end which all acts were to subserve. Distinctions of intensity and duration might well be drawn inductively between one pleasure and another; but to introduce a distinction of *higher* and *lower* is to wallow back into the mire of mere morality, from which Utilitarianism had washed us.

Mr. H. Spencer swerves also from the directness of Bentham's language by a variation in phraseology whereby 'pleasure' and 'happiness' and 'well-being' are used as convertible terms.

This change of terms lends a spurious plausibility to some of his statements. The conclusion that 'approach to perfection really means approach to that which secures greater happiness,'<sup>1</sup> would appear less acceptable if the last word were 'pleasure.' And yet pleasure is what is meant, and 'pleasure' is the word used in the more exact formulations of doctrine, as where we are told that 'it becomes undeniable that, taking into account immediate and remote effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable.'<sup>2</sup> The only serious alteration which Mr. Spencer endeavours to introduce in Bentham's doctrine rests on a further confusion of pleasure (or happiness) with physical health. 'The view for which I contend,' he says, 'is, that morality properly so-called—the science of right conduct—has for its object to determine *how* and *why* certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the

<sup>1</sup> *Data of Ethics*, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* p. 30.

constitution of things ; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognised as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.' Such a proposal to invest the professors of Biology with the functions of General Booth is certainly original. The more consistent Utilitarians, however, naturally objected to this dogmatic and deductive treatment of their pleasures and pains, and Mr. Spencer is left lamenting that 'it is supposed that in future, as now, utility is to be determined only by observation of results, and that there is no possibility of knowing by deduction from fundamental principles what conduct *must* be detrimental and what conduct *must* be beneficial.'<sup>1</sup>

We may return, then, to the main principle of Utilitarianism, that the good which is to be realised

<sup>1</sup> *Data of Ethics*, p. 58.



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These objections to the philosophy of pleasure have never been urged with more vigour and eloquence than by Mazzini. No system of morality, he is always insisting, can be gained from considerations of interest apart from religion, or of rights apart from duties. Thus, after alluding to the overthrow of 'the first high priests of the idol of Interest,' namely, the kings, princes, and corrupt

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These objections to the philosophy of pleasure have never been urged with more vigour and eloquence than by Mazzini. No system of morality, he is always insisting, can be gained from considerations of interest apart from religion, or of rights apart from duties. Thus, after alluding to the overthrow of 'the first high priests of the idol of Interest,' namely, the kings, princes, and corrupt

governments of the day, he addresses the followers of Fourier and Bentham as follows :<sup>1</sup> ' You, who arose the day after, without strong religious beliefs, from the height of which you might have justly overthrown their ugly edifice, without sufficient courage to engage in a death struggle with them, have borrowed the weapons of the enemy, and have said to your followers : *They preach the interest of a single class ; we will preach the interest of all.* An absurd and impossible dream ! Either you desire to be true to the worship of liberty, of the human *person*—and in that case you will never be able to reconcile the general interest with that of the individual, the victory of the strong over the weak will meet you as the last outcome of all material progress—or, in seeking to avoid this danger, you will be constrained to violate liberty, which is the one guarantee of progress you possess.'

The doctrine of individual rights must issue either in the exploitation of the weak or in a despotic system of state socialism. Hence the

<sup>1</sup> *Systems and Democracy*, § 1. Complete works, vii. 342.

doctrine itself is wrong. 'Without<sup>1</sup> the religion of Duty, no great transformation of society is possible. Every such transformation implies an increasing development of association. Now, from the idea of *right* nothing can spring except individual interest; and individual interest does not create association, but rather tends to dissolve it. If the theory of *well-being* is the ruling principle of the transformation, it leaves unbridled the instincts which spur the individual to pleasure, enthrones egoism in the soul, and sanctifies appetite. No reform founded on such elements could be permanent.'

Now, as opposed to Greek Ethics, which deals with man as citizen, and to Utilitarianism, which deals with man as animal, Christianity is occupied with the nature of man as man. In antagonism to the narrow Greek conception, Christianity looks at man in the true universality of his nature as a *person*; and, in antagonism to the low view of Utilitarianism, it regards him in the light of his

<sup>1</sup> *Systems and Democracy*, § 1. Complete works, vii. 352.



highest characteristic as a spirit. It is the peculiar excellence of Christian morality that it maintains this twofold point of view ; that, in breaking down all bars of severance between man and man, it at the same time exalts and magnifies the nature of humanity. Christianity is, in fact, the only system which deals fairly and frankly with man as man, neither narrowing the area nor degrading the substance. And it has in consequence an unequalled sureness of touch in developing the duties of men. Duty, in the eyes of Christianity, does not spring from membership in any exclusive clique, but rests on the spiritual nature of the individual in his relation to other individuals. Thus, in talking of duties between man and man, Christianity means duties owed by spiritual creatures to each other. The society within which duties exist is mankind as a kingdom of spiritual beings. And, accordingly, the common good which the virtuous man is to further, the good aimed at in Christian ethics, is not the corporate glory of the state, or the private pleasure of the animal,

but the training and development of personality, the perfecting of human character. Now, the true personality of man rests on the fact of sonship to God, involving necessarily a relation of brotherhood to other men. The development of personality consists, therefore, in a growing consciousness of that fact of sonship, and a growing recognition of that ethical relation ; and the perfect character is one in which the sonship and the brotherhood are supreme and ruling principles.

The good sought in Christian morality is thus one in which two elements, the mystical and the practical, faith and love, are fused together in an indissoluble sacramental union. A man cannot be taught his sonship to God without being taught also the brotherhood of men. 'If a man say I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. For he who loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen ? And this commandment hath we from Him, that he who loveth God love his brother also.' And, on the other hand, Christian ethics bases this love

of man on the common fatherhood of God. This raises and purifies the nature of the service to be rendered. 'Man shall not live by bread alone.' He is a son of God, to be treated with reverence; his self-respect must be safeguarded from abuse. The cheap charity which turns him into a cadger and a pauper is a direct violation of Christian morality. It costs more than *that* to redeem his soul—more trouble, and, incidentally, more money too. True philanthropy is the love of man in the light of his highest capacities and his noblest endowment, as a being capable of union with God and of duties to other men; a being invested with a claim to reverence and with a debt of responsibility.

Social work, if it is to achieve real and lasting benefits, must thus think of man, neither ignoring his mysterious greatness nor stifling his sense of duty. The perfection of human character through faith working by love—such is the nature of the common good in the eyes of Christianity.

Faith is the capacity of spiritual insight; love

is the substance of spiritual action. Both point from themselves to God. Faith receives the grace of God, and love puts it into operation, Neither in itself is anything ; both are made what they are by God's gift of grace. God sends the grace ; faith is the receptive mind, and love is the renovated will. Faith issues necessarily in works of love, since the grace which faith receives is nothing other than the indwelling and constraining presence of Christ. That presence cannot be received and yet remain inoperative. Lack of faith may reject it ; but the act of faith which accepts it, accepts it as an active power. *Πράξει ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ εὖ πράξει.* And love in the same way implies faith ; it is the manifestation or output of faith. The love of man cannot dispense with faith in Christ. The only true ultimate object of human service is to put eternal life within the reach of others. The subsidiary object is to supply the conditions under which they may lay hold of it, and to remove the obstacles, such as oppression, or sin, or ignorance, which keep them from it. Now, the work of love,

which would thus bring men to Christ, must itself be inspired by faith in Christ. And, lastly, from the union of faith and love springs hope. Hope is a peculiarly Christian grace ; both faith and love are necessary to its production. Faith without love would be without hope also ; it would be the faith of the devils who believe and tremble. And love without faith must in the same way be attended by despair ; it is a passionate defiance hurled at fate by a heart which knows not what to desire. But the faith which works by love, the love rooted in faith, is sustained by hope ; for Christ is Lord of all, and His presence is the light, the support, the reward, the pledge of success, the seal of blessedness, in all human affection and all religious aspirations.

And, thirdly, the motive to Christian actions of benevolence is reverence for the sacredness of this human personality ; devotion to the well-being of men for the sake of their humanity in its catholic wholeness, not for the sake of that fragment of their nature in virtue of which they are members



of a state, nor of that other fragment in virtue of which they are animal organisms. It is the reverence for human nature which is to impel men to acts of loving-kindness. But an objection arises. Humanity, it will be urged, includes whole classes of people whom the fine taste of the Greeks had rightly excluded from consideration. How can a sense of fellowship with these disagreeable, and often repulsive persons, become invested with a power and attractiveness which shall prove stronger than all the allurements of a pleasant and cultured exclusiveness? Is there not hypocrisy in the very pretence that such a thing is possible? Is not a subtle self-seeking, a spirit of 'other-worldliness,' the real motive of these so-called philanthropists?

In dealing with this objection we may lay down two principles. First, if a man is to act disinterestedly for the good of other men, he must regard them as members of a system or society to which he himself belongs; and the wider this system is the more disinterested does the act become. And, secondly, this society must be one which is capable

of being strongly and attractively conceived. Without the former condition, not even disinterested emotion would be possible. Without the latter, the disinterested emotion would be too weak to express itself in action. The ideal of unselfish action requires that the system should be as wide as possible in its area, and as attractive as possible in its presentation. This sense of a common system to which they both belong, a common nature which they share, makes it possible for a man to love his neighbour as himself.

Apart from such a conception of a common nature, there can be no unselfish action, because, apart from it, B must remain a mere outsider in the eyes of A, and A in benefiting B will be only exploiting him in his own interest. For instance, A may be a candidate, and B a voter ; A may be a prince, and B a jester ; A may be the possessor of superfluous wealth, and B a beggar. In all these cases A may do something for B, but in all of them he will be really acting for himself, for his own advantage, his own amusement, the relief of

his own feelings. For, whilst the people stand in that sort of relationship, they are mere heterogeneous particulars, with no common nature in which they are linked and bound together. A universal middle term is as necessary for moral action as it is for logical inference. And, secondly, if the disinterested desire is to be strong enough to issue in action, this common nature must be one which is capable of being attractively presented. In this sense we can readily admit the possibility of disinterested action, not only within the limits of a family, but also in the service of a small Greek city-state. For there the bond of union was obvious and intense. Now, if we pass from the good of the family and the good of the city to the good of all mankind, it is obvious that action directed to the good of that wider whole would be more genuinely disinterested. But can this common nature be so strongly conceived and attractively presented as to triumph over all selfish motives and affirm itself in action? Must not the strength of the motive diminish in proportion to

the width of the system which is to inspire it? Must not the pure disinterestedness, whereby man should act for the good of man, be practically powerless and remain a sentimental and visionary ideal? We answer that this would undoubtedly be the case if Christianity, in universalising the area of humanity, had at the same time degraded its nature and attributes. But this, as we have seen, it refused to do. It had maintained the spirituality of man in the same breath in which it had abolished the barriers between different sorts of men. And therefore that very abolition had enhanced, instead of sullyng, the essential greatness of man. The splendour of his spiritual endowment shone with all the greater lustre by being stripped of alien and artificial ornament. Thus conceived, his personality is seen to unite and gather into itself all the different aspects of humanity, which are apt to be taken in too great isolation from each other. Those who find humanity dull, commonplace, uninteresting, do so because they have failed to grasp the concrete

fulness of man's nature, but have seized on some one element in it, such as his body, or his intelligence, and have distorted that into a spurious whole. If they thus insist on regarding him either as a pig or as a prig, it is no wonder that they should cease to take an interest in him; but in either case they have themselves to thank for the result. Of course it is inevitable that, both for practical and for speculative purposes, man should be looked at from different points of view, that different elements in his nature should be emphasized and brought into relief. But for that very reason it is important never to forget that there is a central unity of the man himself which holds these elements together, and which defies the disintegrating solvents of scientific philanthropy and philosophical analysis. And this is the unity of a spiritual nature, which saves him from being that hybrid dualism of alien elements into which we complacently try to resolve him.

In Christianity man stands revealed in the wholeness of his nature, in the splendour of his



possibilities. Human personality and human character henceforth take their place as the crowning fact of the universe, the one great concrete reality, in comparison with which all else fades into nothingness. All the forces and activities that play about us, the discoveries of science, the complicated system of trade and commerce, social and political life, the multitudinous links of connection between man and man, all combine into a subtle and intricate web of machinery, of which the object is to produce the fabric of perfect human character. The world presents itself as God's great factory, with the roar of its engines and the whirling of its wheels; whilst the end of it all is the making of man, the perfecting of his manhood as a spiritual unity. Personal character is the end. Civilisation is the means. To train, or preserve, or rescue, this spiritual personality throughout the whole society, is the motive of Christian ethics, a motive which appeals to all the generosity, the chivalry, the compassion which human nature is capable of feeling.

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Thus, in the hands of Christianity the good of man becomes invested with an unparalleled attractiveness ; it becomes an ideal capable of exercising a sovereign fascination on the soul, an ideal which can appeal to men's wills and emotions with an even stronger power than that which the welfare of the city-state exerted on the mind of a Greek citizen.

In this way duty and not rights, religion and not individual interest, is the motive force of Christian ethics. It follows that Christianity can work out its ends by free association. External compulsion may be the only way to induce selfish pleasure-seekers to respect each other's rights. But the Christian may be trusted to use freedom without abusing it, to exercise individuality without becoming an individualist. For duty, the duty of love, is the law of his life. The selfish life is killed, and the Spirit of Him who raised up Jesus from the dead dwells in his heart ; the fruit of the Spirit is love, and love needs no compulsion. A visionary ideal, contradicted by all the crude

bestiality, all the smug self-seeking, of a so-called Christian age! Certainly the state of things is blasphemous enough, but it is a still deeper blasphemy to acquiesce in it as though it were inevitable, a still more cruel wrong to advocate a social system which treats man, the temple of the Holy Ghost, as though he was necessarily nothing but a glutton and an adulterer. Mazzini was right in declaring that hedonistic socialism could never rest on a permanent foundation. The tyranny of the stronger would be sure to reassert itself; the system of state regulations would crumble into dust; individualism would return, with an increased measure of cruelty and meanness, and freedom would be as far off as ever. The real solution lies, not in assuming an exaggerated degradation and propounding an impossible compromise, but in returning to a true view of human personality. Man is the Spirit-bearer; Christ is his life and his hope; he can therefore love his neighbour as himself, since both are members in

one and the same great spiritual kingdom of ends.

What, then, on the whole, does Christianity do for morals? The answer may be summed up by saying that it fixes aright both the area and the object of duty, and supplies it with a motive force both pure and powerful. The good which Christian ethics sets before itself is the essential good of man—that is, the good of man as a spiritual creature; it refuses to allow this good to shrivel into the good of a clique of men, or to evaporate into the vagueness of mere pleasurable feeling. And, secondly, the value and dignity of man, as revealed in the person and the doctrine of Christ, supplies philanthropy with a motive force of unequalled strength. Christianity thus enables us to widen the area of duty, without obscuring the definiteness of its aim or weakening the power of its appeal. And the Christian Church, in which this service is to be rendered, thus becomes the highest of all societies. It is a *catholic* Church

in a combination of two important senses of the word. It is open to every individual ; and it embraces the individual in the spiritual wholeness of his nature. The former characteristic guarantees the disinterestedness of the service rendered ; the latter, the strength of its motive force.



## VI

## INSTITUTIONS

WE have insisted before on the importance of institutions, such as the family, the Church, and the State, as instruments for the perfection of individual character, as opportunities for an unselfish life. Their value in this respect cannot be exaggerated. It consists in the fact that they are *wholes*, enabling the individual to transcend his own selfish particularity and to live for a system which extends beyond himself and unites him to other people. The selfish life is a partial, incomplete, fragmentary life. It is a life which must be 'lost,' 'hated,' 'crucified,' if a man is to find his true life—the life lived for the whole in which he is a member. And the different insti-

tutions, with their varying degrees of comprehensiveness, make up the progressive education of the individual. He is trained, first, to live and act as a member of a family, choosing the good of the household instead of his own selfish pleasure. Later, he is taught to take a wider sweep, and aim at the welfare of his fellow-villagers or fellow-townsmen. Then he is made aware of his membership in the State and his responsibilities as a citizen. Finally, he discovers that he is a man and belongs to a community which is nobler and more inspiring in its nature and its aims than any of the narrower societies below. It is thus in and through institutions that a man is trained to unselfishness, is led to take wider and truer views of life, until he comes to recognise affinities and duties which bind him in fellowship to all mankind. The sacredness of institutions lies, then, in the invaluable education which they give to character. But this fact is often forgotten, and their nature often misunderstood. In their zeal for the institution, people often distort the relation

in which it stands to the individual. They tend to substantiate, personify, and even deify the institution in its corporate capacity, as though it had an existence of its own apart from the individuals of whose nature it is a partial realisation. Hence spring all sorts of fallacies, which have as their common result the misunderstanding and degradation of individual life, and in all of which the theorist simply falls a victim to his own abstractions. It is true, indeed, that the highest elements of human character are developed and perfected in institutions ; but it is also true that all these lines of development meet in the central fact of individual personality. The whole significance of institutions consists in the fact that individuals are in them associating themselves with each other in order to affirm and express certain ideals and aspirations of their nature. Institutions are not substantives but adjectives. They are aspects or manifestations of the individual. They qualify him as social, as related in various ways to other individuals. It is indi-

viduals alone who have substantial reality. And, further, not only is every institution in the position of an attribute, but each institution by itself is an abstract attribute. Each is a partial outcome, a limited expression of an individuality which in its concrete variety transcends them all. No single society to which a man belongs can exhaust the fulness of his personality. One institution may express his trade principles, another his political opinions, another his religious convictions, and so forth. But each of these relations is simply an attribute of the man's comprehensive personality, and each becomes an unreal abstraction if divorced from its fellow-attributes. If we ascribe an independent life and reality to each separate institution, we commit a twofold fallacy, and fall into the silliest of all idolatries, the worship of an abstract attribute. The error is rooted in a crude idea that a fact cannot be real except in the sense of material existence. People see that society and its various institutions and associations are true and all-important, and express their admiration in

a blundering way by investing them with a hybrid and spurious substantiality. The most familiar form which the fallacy assumes is the doctrine of the Social Organism, which has been made the text for much ethical theorising and is the basis of the so-called science of Sociology. The doctrine itself is both false and degrading. It is false because it ascribes a sort of gross material existence to society, which really consists of the moral relations of individuals to each other. And it is degrading because it regards individuals as mere tissues in this fictitious organism, mere limbs in this animal monstrosity, without free initiative or rational responsibility. No ethical teaching can rest on such a basis. The membership of limbs in a body is a physical fact and not a moral duty. It is a relation which in no way depends on recognition and acceptance by the elements concerned. But this recognition and acceptance are essential to any moral relationship between rational creatures, and, the deeper is their recognition and the fuller their acceptance of it, the more perfect



does the relationship itself become. In fact, to tell a man to act as a member of a social organism is to tell him to abjure his reason, deny his responsibility, and become a 'limb' moved by the arbitrary fiat of a power in which he has no share.

Society is something far higher than an organism, inasmuch as free co-operation between rational beings is higher than unconscious juxtaposition of material particles; and the higher cannot be profitably illustrated from the lower. Of course the object of the doctrine is to emphasise the closeness of the connection which ought to exist between individuals in society; but it is nevertheless inexcusable that, with this object in view, a theory should have been framed in which the word 'ought' has no meaning, and in which any self-conscious connection is impossible.

The same fallacy appears in 'Sociology,' with its claim to predict the tendencies of social development. Indeed, as suggested above, Sociology is rooted in the organism theory of society. It assumes that society is a sort of monstrous animal,

and goes on to maintain, first, that this animal must have a body ; and, secondly, that the growth of that body can be foretold by social anatomy and social physiology. Just as, in the case of a child, we can distinguish the growth of the body, which can be predicted by science, from the action and experiences which can only be stated biographically after the fact ; so, it is argued, in society there is a structure whose growth can be predicted, as distinct from the incidents which are stated after the event in history. But if society is not an animal, and has got no body, then this power of prediction disappears, and sociology goes with it. And unless we become slaves of an analogy which is very obvious, very superficial, and very fallacious, we must admit that there is nothing in society which can be justly compared to the body of an individual. Society consists entirely of the rational and moral relations in which individuals stand to each other. Undoubtedly some of these relations are more permanent than others ; but if we must compare the more permanent of them to anything in

the individual, it will not be to his *body* but to his *habits*. Just as habits issue from the continued rational action of an individual, so permanent social relations issue from continued inter-action between rational individuals. Now the habits of an individual cannot be predicted, because they depend not on the growth of his body, but on his rational and moral behaviour. And so too the permanent social relations defy prevision, since they are the outcome of the moral and rational achievements of aggregated individuals, and would be modified by any change in the moral and rational attitude of individuals to each other.

The same error of substantiating the institution may be illustrated from Hegel. 'Since ethical determinations,' he says, 'make up the nature of freedom, they form the substantial reality or universal essence of individuals, *who are related to them as accidents*. Whether the individuals exist or not, is indifferent to the objective ethical system, which alone has permanence, and which is the power through which the life of individuals is governed. The ethical

system has therefore been presented to the peoples under the guise of eternal justice or absolute deity, against which the vain striving of individuals is but the play of rippling waves.' <sup>1</sup> And so again, 'Spirit has reality, and the accidents of reality are individuals.' <sup>2</sup> These are no isolated or exaggerated expressions into which a philosopher may sometimes be betrayed; they are the normal and necessary utterance of Hegelianism. 'Thought,' as Professor Wallace says, 'which is the object of the Hegelian logic, is not merely our thought. It is the universe or totality, of which we and the so-called things are merely fragments, held apart by abstraction.' <sup>3</sup> It would be difficult to conceive a more complete reversal of the truth than is offered in this extract from the *Rechtsphilosophie*. Instead of asserting that individuals are accidents and abstractions, we must maintain that it is the individual who possesses substantial reality, that the ethical system gains all its significance in being

<sup>1</sup> *Rechtsphilosophie*, p. 206.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* 215.

<sup>3</sup> *Logic of Hegel*, p. 275.



a channel for the fulness of individual life, and that the dangers of abstraction could not be better illustrated than in this endowment of ethical relations with a life and reality of their own.

But these theories after all only illustrate a view of institutions which is very common, and which, when logically thought out, issues in the extreme forms which have been reviewed. If we regard the good of the institution itself as an end to be achieved, we have already by implication invested it with an independent existence ; and whether we consider it to exist as an animal or as 'pure deity' is a matter of comparative indifference. If we would avoid this error altogether, we must be continually on our guard against the snares of abstraction. The temptation is real and insidious. We see that men can only live a worthy and adequate life in the institutions of society. Hence we talk of Family and Trade Union, Church and State, with an approval which, if we are not very careful, leads us to distort their character and function. Having started by regarding them rightly as *means*



enabling individuals to live for each other, we come to regard them wrongly as *ends*, to which individuals are to be sacrificed. The transition is fatally easy. It is due to the very complexity and variety of individual life. There are countless institutions which touch the individual at different points, and each of which has its own claim upon him. And, further, there must be a clear definition of sphere and object if each of them is to prove effective. They each label the individual, accordingly, from the point of view of their own inspiring motive; and it is only natural that the man himself in the essential oneness of his nature should tend to disappear in the multiplicity of institutions. He seems to be rent asunder into a thousand fragments, each one of which is triumphantly exhibited by the various societies as a proof of their own militant activity. The complex variety of individual life is lost sight of, and the unfortunate man figures merely as a unit in this, that, and the other institution, where his value and significance lie in the fact that, added to other units, he helps to swell

the total and to effect an 'unprecedented average' of members. The corporate prosperity of the institution is apt to be aimed at rather than the welfare of the individuals who compose it; Friendly Societies are tempted to unfriendly competition; Trade Unions are too often false to the sacred principle of free combination in their treatment of the 'blackleg;' and Churches are sometimes so anxious to increase the numbers of their flock that their work loses in depth what it gains in area. Institutions, then, require to be reminded that they are machinery meant for the perfecting of character; that they are the various modes in which individuals may give expression to their conviction of brotherhood and their capacity for self-sacrifice; and that they gain their peculiar sacredness by being means to such an end. Institutions were made for man and not man for institutions.

Now, if institutions are to fulfil this function of educating character, they must have liberty. They must be free associations voluntarily formed and

voluntarily maintained. Compulsion would utterly blight their moral purpose.

Institutions are means for the establishment of moral relationships between individuals ; their whole glory lies in that fact ; and, further, the whole glory of morality lies in its being freely and deliberately chosen for its own sake. Compulsion kills morality, and thereby ruins the whole character of institutions. It kills morality ; for the excellence of morality consists in the disinterested motive, and compulsion cannot prescribe the disinterested motive (unselfishness cannot be ordered by Act of Parliament), but, on the contrary, goes far to make it impossible. It is very difficult to do from a high moral motive an act which one is also compelled to do. A coarse, brutal motive, avoidance of punishment, takes the place of the moral desire to do one's duty. Liberty is indispensable, not because liberty is itself the chief good in life, but because without liberty there can be no morality ; not because ' everyone ought to act as he pleases,' but because no one can act as he ought unless he

acts freely. Of course this freedom to act aright may degenerate into licence to act capriciously. But then virtue would not exist unless vice was open as an alternative; and if vice were made impossible, virtue would *ipso facto* disappear.

The question then is, Are men to be turned into non-moral automata, aliens alike to vice and virtue, or are they to remain moral agents, free to devote themselves disinterestedly to virtue and free to choose vice instead? That is the broad issue. We may regard man as an automaton, and we may regard him as a moral agent. But the two views cannot be combined and fused; one or the other must be supreme. If the *moral agent* view is adopted, State interference will be minimised and transformed. Compulsion will only be employed in order to prepare a soil in which freedom may grow and flourish. Freedom requires security to life and property: hence State compulsion rightly provides laws against murder and theft, the Factory Acts being naturally included under the former head. Freedom requires that children



shall be taught the meaning of the issues on which they will afterwards have to exercise their own volition: hence the justification of compulsory education. Freedom demands the right to form combinations for the furtherance of social or industrial welfare: hence the State has properly interfered to remove barriers and restrictions in all such matters. But when freedom has thus been supplied with its necessary conditions, it must be exempt from further interference if it is to be a basis for morality or the perfecting of character. Of course we may, on the other hand, frankly embrace the *automaton* theory, give up morality and character altogether, and look simply at external results. The State might conceivably make it impossible for a man to get drunk; it might regulate the hours of his work and fix the amount of his wages; it might build his house, order his dinner, and send him to bed at a given hour. And such a policy would probably increase the material well-being of the community; society would be a *ἡὼν πόλις*, the members of which would be com-



fortable, well fed, and free from cares and anxiety. Only we must not attempt to introduce any idea of virtue into such a community. Morality cannot be superimposed on conditions like these.<sup>1</sup> If free co-operation is declared to be insufficient and unnecessary in the lower and more elementary needs of life, it will hardly survive to inspire its higher and more impalpable ideals. The denial of freedom and morality in one whole department of life is scarcely calculated to strengthen them in others ; compulsion in one demands compulsion in all.

Is, then, the State condemned to a masterly inactivity? And if not, what is its function with regard to the misery and the struggles of individual life? It may be suggested in reply that

<sup>1</sup> ' The liberty, the dignity, and the conscience of the individual disappear in an organisation of productive machines. It may, perhaps, satisfy the physical life ; but it ruins the moral and intellectual life, together with all emulation, all free choice of work and free association, all stimulus to production, all the delights of property —everything, in fact, which encourages progress. It regards the human family as a herd which only asks to be led to an abundant pasturage.'—Mazzini, *Duties of Man*, xi. 3, p. 121, popular edition. Rome, 1875.

the State has here a twofold function : first, the relief of destitution ; and, secondly, the recognition and encouragement of free associations. In England, the first may be illustrated by its Poor Law ; the second by its attitude to Friendly Societies and Trade Unions. In the Poor Law the State recognises the duty of supplying food, shelter, and clothing to all destitute people. However imprudent or vicious a man's life may have been, the State undertakes to provide for him to that extent ; whilst at the same time it insists that his lot as a pauper shall be less desirable than that of the independent citizen. This condition is absolutely necessary, in order to avoid as far as possible any relaxation of moral ties and any weakening of the feelings of duty and responsibility between members of a family or a neighbourhood. If it is rigorously enforced, it safeguards the sense of duty. It stimulates parents and children to help each other, and it also stimulates private charity to keep off the rates those who have met with undeserved misfortune. The Poor

Law, thus rigorously administered, represents the high-water mark of justifiable State help. The State undertakes to save a man from dying of starvation or exposure. It does not undertake to relieve his neighbours and relations of the duties laid upon them by the facts of kinship and humanity.

The relation which in England the State has assumed towards free associations of working men is very significant. Having passed through a phase of hostility based on misunderstanding, it has gradually taken up an attitude of friendly recognition and encouragement. There has been a great deal of legislation on the subject of these societies, but extraordinarily little compulsion. This fact is peculiarly striking in the case of Friendly Societies. Such societies are encouraged to register themselves, and certain privileges and responsibilities accrue to those which do so. Every facility for registration is supplied in the shape of a Chief Registrar, supported by deputies, a skilled actuary, and a staff of clerks; but at the same time it rests entirely with the societies them-

selves to decide whether they will take advantage of these facilities or not. No society is compelled by the State to register itself. Complete privacy is within the reach of those which prefer it. The duties imposed on registered societies are not very alarming. 1. They are required to submit to an annual audit and make a return of their financial position, as audited, to the Chief Registrar. 2. They must also send in a quinquennial valuation of assets and liabilities, which is useful in making explicit the exact financial position of the society from an actuarial point of view. 3. The Chief Registrar has the right to intervene if a representation of maladministration is made by a certain proportion of members, to institute an examination, and, if necessary, order the dissolution of the society.

The privileges conferred by the Act upon registered societies may be shortly expressed by saying that it gives them a legal status. They receive the power of acquiring and holding property, and of suing and being sued as corporations; and in cases of fraud they may have

recourse to courts of summary jurisdiction against their officers. Further, there is a very significant enactment which shows the scrupulous respect shown by the State for liberty and self-government in these societies. 'Every dispute between a member and the society or an officer thereof shall be decided in the manner directed by the rules of the society, and the decision so made shall be binding and conclusive on all parties without appeal, and shall not be removable into any court of law or restrainable by injunction; and application for the enforcement thereof may be made to the County Court.'<sup>1</sup>

The State thus brings to bear the minimum of compulsion on the societies which choose to accept its regulations. The further control exercised over individual members comes from within the societies themselves, and is entirely self-imposed. Thus the large registered Order of the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows has a code of eighty-nine rules which are authoritative throughout the Order. These

<sup>1</sup> Friendly Societies Act, 1875, § 22.



are supplemented in various local centres by District codes incumbent on all lodges within the district ; whilst, lastly, each separate lodge has its own additional rules drawn up at its own discretion, provided they do not conflict with the code of the District or that of the Order. Now, the Manchester Unity alone has a total of over 700,000 members, a capital of 7,350,000*l.*, a yearly income of 1,300,000*l.*, and an annual expenditure of 680,000*l.* on sick benefits.<sup>1</sup> Similar figures could be given for the Order of Foresters. And there are smaller societies, such as the Hearts of Oak and others, which are thoroughly solvent, and do as great a work in proportion to their numbers. In these friendly societies, then, we have a group of beneficent, self-governing institutions, merely endowed by the State with a legal personality, and in return for that privilege submitting to the slightest possible amount of public supervision.

In the case of Trade Unions recognition by the State has been more gradual and guarded, as

<sup>1</sup> Grand Master's Inaugural Address, 1891.

was only natural in view of their pugnacious and semi-political character. But at last, after many vicissitudes, it has been effected. The old laws against combination of workmen were repealed in the sensible and spirited Act of 1824; but new restrictions, almost as rigorous, were introduced in the reactionary measure which superseded it in the following year. Then came a long succession of labour disputes, strikes, trials, and royal commissions, until in 1871 the Trade Union Act declared that 'the purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member of such trade union liable to criminal prosecutions for conspiracy or otherwise.' (§ 2.) The Act goes on to apply to Trade Unions much the same treatment that we have noticed in the case of friendly societies. It allows them to register themselves, gives a legal status to those which do so, and requires them in return to send in annual returns of their financial position, &c.

But, on the other hand, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, passed in the same year, made labour disputes the subject of special penal enactments ; and it was not until 1875 that all *privileges* against labour were finally repealed,<sup>1</sup> and liberty of 'agreement or combination' fully conceded, subject only to sensible and necessary provisions against 'intimidation or annoyance by violence or otherwise.' We may notice, lastly, that the State takes up the same line with regard to internal disputes between trade unionists as with regard to disputes in friendly societies. The Trade Union Act, Section 3, says : 'No legal proceedings can be entertained by any court for breach of any agreement between members of a trade union as such, concerning the conditions on which any members shall or shall not sell their goods, transact business, employ, or be employed.' Disputes of this sort, together with questions as to the payment of sub-

<sup>1</sup> The Employers and Workmen Act and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act were both passed in that year, as well as the Friendly Societies Act alluded to above.

scriptions and application of funds, must be settled privately.

It has thus been the object of the State to secure freedom at all points of industrial activity.

1. It has granted workmen freedom of combination and a fair field in their negotiations with the employer. 2. It insists on freedom for non-unionists to dispose of their labour as they think fit. 3. It encourages independence and self-government among trade unionists in the regulation of their business and the settlement of their disputes.

Or, to put the same facts in different language, the State declares: 1. That it will not itself interfere as judge or umpire in the internal organisation of industry. 2. That it will not allow any of the parties concerned to exercise undue interference with each other's liberty, condemning equally the tyranny of employers over workmen and the tyranny of unionist workmen over non-unionists.

There is to be freedom in a twofold sense—freedom from external State control, and freedom

from internal tyranny, throughout the realm of industry.

In Friendly Societies and Trade Unions, taken together, the workman possesses already, without State aid, a comprehensive system of insurance. In the Friendly Society he can insure against the ordinary ills of life, such as sickness, old age, and death ; whilst the Trade Union helps him to face the special evils incidental to industry by the out-of-work pay given in case of trade fluctuations, and the strike pay given in case of trade disputes.

We have dwelt at this length on the relation of our State to working men's associations because the wisdom of its attitude is not sufficiently known or recognised, and because a certain class of theorists are advocating enactments which would utterly and fatally contradict and stultify its past policy. It is argued that Friendly Societies and Trade Unions are incompetent to solve the labour problems of the age. Searching State intervention, to be followed by permanent State regulation, is accordingly demanded as the only



means of dealing with the misery of the working population. But it would be inexcusable to cut the knot in this way, when so much has already been done to untie it; inexcusable to kill freedom and morality through State compulsion, when free association and moral effort have already done so much to raise and dignify the labouring class. More organisation on the same lines is what is wanted; organisation which shall extend to unskilled workers and shall teach them the lessons of thrift, self-reliance, and solidarity which are being so well mastered by the artisans and mechanics. In that way, and in that alone, can material well-being be achieved without the destruction of character.

Lastly, we may in a few words apply the foregoing principles to the Church, as the greatest of all social institutions. The Church has always run a great danger of being conceived in a wrong relation to individual life. The very magnificence of its ideals, its divine origin, and its unbroken ministry of grace, have increased the peril. Ac-

cordingly we find that it has often been substantiated as an organism, and that in consequence the nature of its communion and fellowship has been degraded and misunderstood. For, if the Church be an organism, individuals are limbs; blind adherence takes the place of free loyalty; rational responsibility is denied and spiritual initiative discouraged; Churchmanship becomes an accomplished fact instead of a moral and spiritual duty. And this organism view, with all its corollaries, is being courageously accepted by modern Roman Catholics. To them the Church has a single and substantial existence of her own, and therefore her present structure, with all its anomalies, must be regarded as an orderly growth from primitive conditions; she speaks with a single voice of infallible authority; the development of her thought and speculation is a development of necessary doctrine; with logical propriety her reason and conscience have lately been vested in a single centre, whilst her members have, as far as their Church life is concerned, been relegated to

the position of tissues in the ecclesiastical body politic. And within the Anglican Church there has been too much paltering with a theory of which Rome is the only logical issue. In many of the speculations concerning the catholicity of our Church its defenders as well as its assailants have accepted the 'limb' theory of Church communion. Its champions laboured to prove that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, it is still a 'branch' or 'member' in the one living organism. And its assailants maintained with more plausibility that this vital connection had been snapped, that by the great schism of the Reformation the Anglican branch had been cut off and withered, the Anglican limb amputated for ever from the body of the Church. It is imperatively necessary to take a higher and truer view of the nature of the Church. Like all institutions, it is something far higher than an organism. It is a communion of saints, a society in which individuals may help each other to live the perfect life, a society which consists in the free association and is developed by

the free co-operation of its members, a society through which these members may gain access to the gifts of grace and truth which come by Jesus Christ. The function of the Church is to bring men to Christ. The ministry, the defence of the faith, the rites, ceremonies, and traditions handed down from the earliest times, are the means by which this end is sought. Apostolical succession and primitive usage are valuable as a pledge and assurance to men that in the Church they are indeed being brought straight to the feet of their incarnate Master. The unity of the Church lies in its common apostolical origin, in the moral and spiritual communion which exists between its members, and in the consentient witness which it bears to Christ. The catholicity of the Church consists partly in its zeal for truth and its respect for legitimate authority, and partly in the universality of its sympathies and its power of winning all sorts and conditions of men to the recognition of the Faith.

In one sense, indeed, the doctrine of a social



organism is more legitimate as applied to the Church than as applied to other institutions ; for the Church *has* a life peculiar to itself and shared in by all its members. This is the life of the one indwelling Spirit, which may be appropriated by each and every follower of Christ. In view of this common inspiration the Church is described sometimes as a temple inhabited by the Holy Ghost, sometimes as the branches of a vine, which is Christ, or as members of a body of which Christ is the head. But the unity thus expressed is always the unity of the Divine Presence—'the same Spirit,' 'the same Lord,' 'the same God'—and is a unity which individual Christians must consciously accept. The error of the limb theory, as applied to the Church, is that it distorts the conception of a *mystical* body, in which individuals have a conscious membership, into that of a *physical* body, to which they necessarily and unconsciously belong. The unity of the mystical body is illustrated by Christ and St. Paul from that of the physical body. A proportion is being stated. The relation



which subsists in the Church between the one life and the many members is compared to that same relation as it is found in the physical organism. Rational individuals stand in the same sort of relation to the one life of the Spirit as that in which the limbs of the body stand to the natural life which governs them. What is that relation? In a word, it is the relation of *receptivity*, by which the gift of a higher endowment is felt and accepted and exercised. Rational creatures are as much transformed by being endowed with the life of the Spirit as material particles are by becoming organic to the physical life which gives them unity and cohesion. In each case a new gift is given, which is not earned or acquired, but simply received—received, however, in the one case through intelligent appropriation, in the other by unconscious passivity. In the Roman theory this difference is ignored; an identity of ratios is turned into an identity of substances, and the result is that an invaluable truth is perverted into a degrading fallacy.

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And, again, the Church must, like all institutions, have liberty of action. It must find room for peculiarities of national character and give scope to individual initiative. The ideal Church would be perhaps a federation of national churches, subjected to the minimum of State interference, each independent of the other, each organising itself in the manner best suited to its surroundings, and each connected with the others in a common descent, a common aim, and the fellowship of a common belief.

And, further, within each separate Church there should be a fuller consciousness than at present exists amongst individuals as to the duties and responsibilities of Churchmanship. In particular it is becoming very necessary in England that laymen should be stimulated to a more intelligent communion. Diocesan conferences and parochial councils are doing something in this direction, but much remains to be done; and in the matter of efficient organisation, combined with elasticity and adaptability of methods, and founded

on individual zeal and intelligence, the Church might learn much from the example of the Manchester Unity. It is to be hoped that this and other lessons will be learnt. The Church surpasses all other institutions in the splendour of its origin, the spirituality of its life, and the purity of the form of brotherhood which it upholds; it should surpass them also in the wisdom of its administration and in the freedom and spontaneity of its work.

We have thus expounded what seems to us a true theory of institutions, and have illustrated it in the case of Friendly Society, Trade Union, Church, and State. We have insisted that the object of institutions is the training of character; that their method is freedom of association; and that their basis is the fact of brotherhood. The nature of the method follows from that of the basis and the aim. Without freedom, brotherhood is caricatured and character destroyed. And in the light of all the three terms combined, institutions are seen to be sacred things. Every form of association into which people enter, however dry or purely com-

mercial it may seem, has an element of friendship at its root.<sup>1</sup> It gains its ultimate value and significance by being a mode of asserting human fellowship and perfecting human character. This is true equally in the factory system, in which men are made members in a great industrial whole and trained in character by the discipline of regular hours, and in the learned society, in which they co-operate to dignify human nature by the acquisition of knowledge.

This perfection of character is an ideal which no individual can fully attain in his life on earth. But we shall not for that reason turn from the individual and worship the institution; we shall maintain the true infinity of the individual and reject the spurious infinity of the substantiated institution. We shall remember that the life of the individual is both eternal and everlasting; that the unselfish devotion to a great ideal of knowledge and goodness has a measure of completeness

<sup>1</sup> Καθ' ὅσον κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσούτων ἐστι φιλία.—Aristotle, *Eth.* viii. 9.

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even now through union with Him in whom the ideal became incarnate ; that those who love the brethren have already passed from death to life ; and that this life will only be perfected hereafter, when the Master will be known face to face in the fulness of His Christhood.

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